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Durham: Residential Land Contracts

FORFEITURE OF RESIDENTIAL LAND CONTRACTS
IN OHIO: THE NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM
OF A REFORM STATUTE
by
JAMES GEOFFREY DURHAM*

I. INTRODUCTION

N THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS,

the use of long-term installment land contracts for

the sale of residential real property in Ohio has increased greatly.' This
trend can be viewed as either positive or negative depending on one's view of
the importance or desirability of the use of land contracts. In either case, it
is troubling that Ohio's unique statute, which specifically defines the rights of
a vendor upon breach of a land contract by the vendee when the real property
is improved by a dwelling, 2 is potentially unfair to the vendee.
In providing remedies for a vendor of a residential land contract when
the vendee is in default, the Ohio statute divides residential land contracts into
two groups: those which have been in effect for less than five years and on
which less than 2007o of the purchase price has been paid,3 and those which
have been in effect for five years or more or on which 2007o or more of the
purchase price has been paid." In the former situation the vendor may obtain
forfeiture and damages by bringing one or more actions against the vendee.,
In the latter situation the vendor must foreclose the vendee's interest using the
statutory procedure for judicial foreclosure of a mortgage.' Remedies for vendors of land contracts concerning property not improved by a dwelling are left
to case law, and forfeiture may or may not be allowed. 7 While one may ques*Assistant Professor, The University of Dayton School of Law; A.B., University of California, Berkeley;
J.D., University of California, Davis. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable editorial assistance
of his spouse, Joan Drake Durham, Attorney at Law. In addition, the author gratefully acknowledges
the research assistant of Robin Ames, Class of 1983 of The University of Dayton School of Law, and
the comments made by Professor Lillian BeVier of the University of Virginia School of Law and Professor
Grant Nelson of the University of Missouri, Columbia, School of Law.
'See infra text accompanying notes 75-96.
'OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.01-. 10 (Page 1981). [Chapter 5313]
'OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.06, 5313.08 (Page 1981).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Page 1981).
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.06, 5313.08 (Page 1981). While it would appear that the doctrine of res
judicatarequires a vendor to bring one action for both forfeiture and damages if he sought both remedies,
an Ohio appellate court has held that a vendor may seek forfeiture in one action and later sue for damages
in another action. Marvin v. Stemen, 68 Ohio App. 2d 26, 426 N.E.2d 205 (Lucas Co. 1980).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Page 1981).
'See infra text accompanying notes 188-225.
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tion whether it is equitable to allow forfeiture in any instance,8 current economic
realities make the distinction drawn by the Ohio statute inequitable; there is,
therefore, clear need for either legislative amendment of Ohio's current law
or broad use by trial courts of their equitable power to fashion appropriate
remedies in land contract default cases.
Perhaps it could be argued that in 1969 when Chapter 5313, Installment
Land Contracts (the "Act"), was enacted, 9 a vendee who had paid less than
20% on a land contract or whose land contract had been in effect less than
five years'" had so small an interest that forfeiture was an equitable remedy.
This argument would have been strengthened by the fact that the Act, when
originally passed, was limited to situations where the purchase price was less
than $30,000." Such a view would have been very much in accord with the
long-time scholarly perception that land contracts are primarily used by lowincome buyers.' 2 If it were true in 1969, it is clearly not the case today. The
$30,000 limitation was removed in 1980,'1 and the economic interests of most
Ohio land contract vendees appear to be quite large" and worth protecting.
In addition it is equally clear that land contracts are being used more and more
by middle and upper income buyers and sellers to avoid high mortgage interest
rates charged by commercial lenders."
The purpose of this article is to examine the problems created by the Act.
In order to do that, the article begins with a background section which more
fully describes the type of contractual arrangement under discussion,' 6 why
people use land contracts,' 7 and the economic factors in the current Ohio real
estate market which have caused an increase in the use of land contracts and
may cause mounting problems with Ohio's land contract statute. 8 The second
section describes the common law treatment of land contract defaults and the
positions taken by states other than Ohio.' 9 The next section discusses Ohio
law both before and after passage of the Act, along with the history of the
'See infra text accompanying notes 264-75. This article does not deal with the deeper questions of the
true fairness of forfeiture and the true efficacy of foreclosure. The focus of the article is on whether and
when forfeiture of land contracts should be allowed given the fact that a mortagee must always foreclose
in order to realize on his security.
'1969 OHIo LAWS 424, 424-30 (effective Nov. 25, 1969).
'This would mean that upon the vendee's default the vendor could avail himself of the forfeiture remedy
contained in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.06 (Page 1981).
'1969 OHIO LAWS 424, 424-30 (effective Nov. 25 1969) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5313.01(B) (Page 1981)).
"See infra text accompanying notes 65-74.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B) (Page 1981) (effective Oct. 6, 1980).

"See infra text accompanying notes 75-96.
"See
"See
"See
"See
"See
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Act."0 The last section considers the various policies raised in the prior sec2
tions and contains proposals for both legislative and judicial action. "
II.

LAND CONTRACTS AND ECONOMIC REALITIES

A. Defining the Scope of "Land Contracts"
The term "land contract" can mean several different things, depending
on the jurisdiction being referred to and the context in which it is used. Perhaps
the best way to define what a land contract is in real estate finance law is to
say that it is not "the ordinary executory contract for the sale of land, variously
22
known as a 'binder,' a 'marketing contract,' or an 'earnest money' contract."
These types of agreements are designed to bind the parties for a short period
of time, usually one or two months, while the parties arrange for the closing
of the sale of the property. 3 These agreements usually allow for termination
of the relationship between the seller and the buyer with the conveyance of
title by deed from the seller to the buyer in exchange for the buyer's tender
of the entire purchase price. ' Alternatively, the seller may choose to participate
in the buyer's financing of the property either by accepting a mortgage or a
5
deed of trust or by entering into a land contract.
The true "land contract" goes by many names, including installment land
26
contract, contract for deed, and long-term land contract, or the all-inclusive
one chosen at the beginning of this article, long-term installment land contract.
A "land contract" is all of these and more.
A land contract is "long-term" because the parties usually anticipate a
27
relationship of several years, from one or two years to twenty years or more.
It is "installment" because the vendee usually makes periodic payments of
2
interest alone or of the principal and interest to the vendor. " Finally, it is a
land contract or "contract for deed" because the vendor retains title and is
only obligated to convey title to the vendee upon the vendee's full compliance
with the terms of the contract, the most important being timely payment of
all money due the vendor.29 Ohio's definition of "land installment contract"
"See infra text accompanying notes 184-263.
'See infra text accompanying notes 264-303.
"Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract- A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 541.
"Id. at 542.
1"This could be accomplished either by tender of the total purchase price in cash, or by tender of the seller's
equity (the difference between the purchase price and the amount owed by the seller to a third party and
secured by the property being sold) in cash by the buyer and the buyer's assumption of the seller's existing
indebtedness secured by a mortgage of deed of trust on the property.
"Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 542. In that case, the parties will have two "contracts," a "binder"
and a "land contract."
1"Id. at 541.
27Id.

21id.
"Id. The vendor will probably also be obligated to make payments to any mortgages while the land contract

force.
is in by
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includes all of these ideas:
"Land installment contract" means an executory agreement which
by its term is not required to be fully performed by one or more of the
parties to the agreement within one year of the date of the agreement and
under which the vendor agrees to convey title in real property located in
this state to the vendee and the vendee agrees to pay the purchase price
in installment payments, while the vendor retains title to the property as
security for the vendee's obligation. Option contacts for the purchase of
real property are not land installment contracts.30
B. Reasons for Using Land Contracts
A land contract fulfills most of the same functions as a purchase money
mortgage3 given to the seller. 32 The primary differences between the two are
the remedies which the vendor/mortgagee has upon default by the
vendee/mortgagor.II Historically, the remedies were similar. Upon a vendee's
default a land contract vendor was traditionally allowed forfeiture, the legally
3
effective declaration by the vendor that the vendee's interest was terminated.
Similarly, a common law mortgage deed originally put title in the mortgagee
and the mortgagor retained only the opportunity to regain title on the "law
day" by repaying the amount loaned; if he failed to repay the loan on the law
day, he lost his only chance to regain title to "his" property.3 5
The situation has now changed. The rights of a mortgagee have eroded,
first by equitable redemption, then by allowing strict foreclosure and now by
the requirement for either judicial or power of sale foreclosure.36 This equitable
requirement of foreclosure is absolute. Today it is fair to say that strict
foreclosure is allowed only in very limited situations3 7 and that no court will
allow a mortgagor, in the mortgage or contemporaneously with its execution,
to waive either foreclosure by sale or his ability to redeem his property prior
to foreclosure.3" A mortgagor may relinquish his interest to the mortgagee by
deed after default, but even then a court will scrutinize the parties' relation"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(A) (Page 1981).
"The terms "mortgage"

and "deed of trust" will be used interchangeably in this article.

"Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 541. The only possible exception is the unrecorded land contract,
which may leave the vendor's mortgagee and the general public without knowledge of the sale.
"This assumes that the transaction is a legitimate one where the contract is either recorded or the vendor
is not trying to take advantage of the vendee. In addition there are problems regarding title and vendee's
remedies which this article will not address. See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON and D. WHITMAN. REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE]; 3 A. CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 11.74-75 (1952); Mixon, Installment Land Contracts:A Study ofLow Income Transactions,
with Proposalsfor Reform and a New Programto Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City, 7 Hous.
L. REV. 523 (1970).

"See OSBORNE, supra note 33, § 3.25; 3 A. CASNER, supra note 33, § 11.75.
"OSBORNE, supra note 33, § 1.2, at 7; 4 A. CASNER, supra note 33, § 16.178, at 427.
"OSBORNE, supra note 33, § 1.4, at 9; 4 A. CASNER. supra note 33, §§ 16.184-185.
"OsBORNE, supra note 33,
38Id.

§

1.4 at 9.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss3/2

4

Winter, 19831

Durham:
Residential LAND
Land Contracts
CONTRACTS
RESIDENTIAL

ship to determine if the transaction was fair to the mortgagor.39
This raises the anomaly of forfeiture of land contracts. Although the rights
of mortgagees have been severely limited and land contracts and mortgages
perform essentially the same basic functions,"0 the concept of forfeiture by a
land contract vendor persists almost unchecked in some jurisdictions, is limited
by legislative or judicial action in others, and has been buried in a few."' As
long as forfeiture exists in some form, it serves as an inducement for a seller
to finance or assist in financing his buyer's purchase by using a land contract
rather than a mortgage. 2
Beyond the traditional advantage of forfeiture, however, at least three addi3
tional modern reasons have arisen for use of land contracts." One important
reason for using a land contract is the favorable treatment for capital gains
from the sale of real property under federal tax laws contained in section 453
of the Internal Revenue Code, the so-called "Installment Sale" section." Section
453 requires a seller of real property, who does not elect otherwise, to proportionately recognize any gain realized from the sale of an asset in the year or
5
years in which the seller receives part or all of the consideration for the sale."
"Id. at § 6.16.
"See infra note 43.
'See infra text accompanying notes 98-183.
4'This seems almost indisputable. Although it is generally agreed that when a person or business entity
makes a loan the last thing desired is default and realization on the security, it is obvious that the lender
will choose the security device which will most easily allow him to recoup his investment. Since most
foreclosure sales of real property result in the mortgagee's buying to protect his investment, if land contract
forfeiture is allowed it clearly makes the land contract more desirable as a security device than a mortgage
because the lender avoids the delay and cost of a foreclosure sale.
"The "reasons" which follow are perhaps more a matter of perception than reality. Each can arguably
be accomplished by the seller of real property accepting a mortgage from his buyer, be it a first mortgage,
a junior mortgage, or a "wrap-around" mortgage. A wrap-around mortgage most resembles a land contract
in that the seller continues to be obligated to make timely payments on any mortgages in existence before
the closing of his sale to the buyer, but it is different in that the seller conveys title and the seller's mortgage
is junior to any existing mortgages. The wrap-around mortgage is in many ways preferable to the land
contract, as title is in the buyer and the deed and mortgage will be recorded. The drawback is that if the
buyer defaults, the seller is forced to foreclose his lien as a mortgage rather than use any "simpler" method
offered by a jurisdiction's land contract law. In jurisdictions where the procedure for terminating a vendee's
interest under a land contract most resembles the foreclosure procedure for a mortgage, the only reason
for using a land contract may be that those structuring the transaction either are not aware of what a
wrap-around mortgage is or prefer to use a more "familiar" device, the land contract.
"I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1982).
"l.R.C. § 453(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1982). Until the changes made in 1980 to I.R.C. § 453, a seller of real
property had to elect installment treatment if and only if he (1) received less than 30 percent of the sales
price in the tax year of sale and (2) received part of the sales price in at least two separate tax years. See
I.R.C. § 453 (1976 and Supp. 11 (1978)), amended by Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-471, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2247, 2247-51 (1980) and by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-34, Title ii, § 202(c), 95 Stat. 172, 221 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1982)). For
sales occurring on or after October 20, 1980, the 30 percent rule has been abolished; an installment occurs
when the vendor receives any part of the sales price in any year other than the tax year of sale. See I.R.C.
§ 453 (West Supp. 1982) and the Committee Report on Public Law No. 96-471, S. Rep. No. 1000, 96th
Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4696. These changes make it much
easier to effect an installment sale, with its attendant possibilities for tax savings. Gain realized on the
sale of a personal residence may be treated as an installment sale. Rev. Rul. 75, 1953-1 C.B. 83.
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This gives the seller a method of saving federal income taxes by using a land
contract rather than selling his property for all cash upon closing.46
A single example will best illustrate the potential savings. Suppose the sales
price for a house is $100,000 but the seller's basis in the house is $60,000, what
he paid for it. If the buyer pays cash and if the seller does not purchase a more
expensive house within twenty-four months,4 7 the seller must recognize in the
year of sale, for federal income tax purposes, his realized gain of $40,000,
the difference between the sales price and his basis. 41 If, on the other hand,
he sells by a land contract with a $30,000 down payment, he will only have
to recognize as gain part of the $30,000 received in the year of sale, not the
$40,000 gain he has realized in making the sale; his recognition of the remainder
of his realized gain will be spread over future years in proportion to the amount
of the sales price he receives in those years.4 9
In this example, if we assume that the seller is in the maximum tax bracket,
50%, it will mean that he will receive in the year of sale $30,000 cash and only
have to pay $2,400 in federal income taxes. 5" Each year in which the seller
receives part of the sales price he will also receive much more cash than the
amount he is obligated to pay as federal income taxes. 5 ' The effect is further
enhanced if, by spreading a gain over two or more years, the taxpayer stays
"This is not to imply that a buyer will be able to buy the property without borrowing money. However,
if the buyer obtains financing from a third party, for example, a new first mortgage from a bank, or
assumes the seller's existing mortgage, the seller will be deemed to have received the entire sales price
in the tax year of sale because he will either pay off any existing load or be relieved from the obligation
of paying it by the buyer's assuming it. Any realized gain resulting from a sales price in excess of the
seller's basis in the property-must be recognized.
'7 I.R.C. § 1034(a) (West 1982) allows a seller to postpone any gain on the sale of a personal residence
if he buys another personal residence of at least equal value within 24 months. If he purchases a house
of lesser value, but one that has a value that is higher than his basis in the house just sold, he must recognize
the gain to the extent that the sales price, less selling expenses, exceeds the higher of his basis in the house
just sold or the purchase price of the new house. Id.
"For simplicity, this assumes there were no costs of selling, which of course would be deductible and
lower the taxable gain and provide a deduction from ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (West 1982) (capital
gain deduction) and I.R.C. § 1034(b)(2)(C) (West 1982) (ordinary income deduction). The gain would
probably be a capital gain and be reduced to 40% of the full gain. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (West 1982).
"The gain that would have to be recognized in any one year is determined by multiplying the total gain
(in the example, this would be determined by subtracting basis from sales price, or $100-000 - $60,000
- $40,000) times a percentage derived by dividing the total amount received in one year by the sales price
(in the example for the year of sale this would be $30,000 - $100,000 = 30%). In the example this would
result in recognition of a capital gain in the year of sale of $40,000 x 30% = $12,000. I.R.C. § 453(c)
(West 1982). The seller would therefore receive $30,000 in cash and only have to pay tax on $12,000 at
the capital gain rate. With the current federal tax system of progressive taxation and deductions, a taxpayer
could obviously benefit from "spreading" a gain over two or more tax years; he may have more deductions
in a future tax year, or, perhaps in combination with deductions, it may keep him in a lower tax bracket.
"$2,400 in tax is derived by applying the capital gain exclusion of 60% to the $12,000 gain which results
in a taxable amount of $4,800 ($12,QOO - (60% x 12,000) = $4,800). I.R.C. § 1202(a) (West 1982).
Since we are assuming that the seller is being taxed on this income in the 50% bracket, he will pay $2,400
in federal income tax ($4,800 x 50% = $2,400).
"Suppose he receives $10,000 in the second year. His tax will be $800. Using the equations from notes
49-50, supra,$800 is derived as follows: $40,000 x ($10,000 - 100,000) = $4,000 gain; $4,000 - (60%
x $4,000) = $1,600 taxable gain; and applying a 50% bracket, $1,600 x 50% = $800. This goes on
until the land contract is fully paid and terminated.
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below the 50% bracket. 2 A land contract which qualifies as an installment
sale for federal income tax purposes can therefore have a dramatic effect on
how much federal income tax is paid by the seller.
The seller usually also gains a financial advantage from a land contract
if there is a mortgage on the property. In the last several years interest rates
on home mortgages have skyrocketed, ranging as high as 18% in 1981." If
the land contract allows the seller to leave an old, low interest rate mortgage
encumbering the property during the term of the land contract, the seller will
realize on the money he actually has at risk a rate of return greater than the
stated interest rate on the land contract.54
Most interestingly, the seller may be able to create a very favorable investment for himself while offering a bargain to the buyer. Using the same basic
example of a $100,000 sales price, suppose the seller's existing mortgage balance
is $40,000 with an 8% per annum interest rate and that the land contract provides for a $30,000 down payment and interest on the $70,000 balance of 12%
per annum. Although the stated interest rate on the land contract is 12%, a
bargain for the buyer, the effective yield for the seller on his "investment"
of $30,000 is 17.3%; the seller gets the "spread" between the 876 he pays the
bank for the amount he owes the bank, $40,000, and the 12% the buyer is
paying him for the "same" $40,000 in addition to 12% on the seller's $30,000."1
An interest rate of 17.3% is a solid return on the seller's investment.56
Last, but perhaps most important, offering a land contract may help the
seller find a buyer because the buyer's cost of buying the house is obviously
less if he spends less on financing.57 In addition, even if the seller has buyers
available, he may be able to get a higher price for his house by using a land
contract.
"See supra note 49.
"Dayton Area Mortgage Rates, Dayton Daily News, Sept. 27, 1981, at 10-E, col. 1.
4"Money
he has at risk" means the seller's equity in the property or sales price still unpaid by the vendee
less current mortgage balance.
"The seller has $30,000 of "his" money at risk, the $70,000 "loaned" to the buyer less the $40,000 the
seller has borrowed from the bank. The seller is receiving $8,400 in interest per year, 12% x $70,000.
The seller is paying the bank $3,200 in interest per year, 807o x $40,000. He is netting $5,200, or $8,400
- $3,200, on an investment of $30,000 of his money, for an effective interest rate of 17.3%, or $5,200
+ $30,000. Note that the less of "his" money the seller has at risk, the higher the effective interest the
seller receives. If the down payment in the example is lowered to $20,000, the seller has $40,000 at risk
and his effective return is 160o. If the down payment in the example is raised to $40,000, the seller has
$20,000 at risk and his effective return is 20%.
"The less the seller has at risk the greater his return. See supra note 55. If the underlying mortgage is
amortized and if the land contract is not amortized, or if the land contract amortizes more slowly than
or at the same rate as the underlying mortgage, the seller's money in the transaction increases, i.e., he
owes less and is owed the same, or not as much less than he owes. In that case, the effective interest rate
will drop over the term of the land contract. On the other hand, in the unlikely event that the underlying
mortgage is either unamortized or amortizes more slowly than the land contract, his effective rate will
increase. Finally, if they are both unamortized the effective rate remains constant.
"People-to-PeopleFinancingEncouragesFresh Starts and Brighter Outlooks, Real Estate Today, April
1982,byatIdeaExchange@UAkron,
12, 13.
Published
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First, most land contracts have interest rates far below the prevailing commercial interest rates. For example, the median interest rate for land contracts
recorded in 1981 in Montgomery County, Ohio (Dayton and its suburbs) was
11 %,11 while commercial interest rates for the same period ranged up to 18%.
In addition, most commercial lenders charge "points, ' 60 which can be
as much as 4% of the loan amount, 6' as a fee for originating a loan. With
a $100,000 sales price, and an $80,000 loan amount, it is fair to say that most
buyers and sellers would negotiate for a $3,200 change in a $100,000 purchase
price.
Finally, the lower cost of financing has two effects. The buyer's cost of
housing is substantially reduced 61 thereby either making the purchase of a home
less burdensome or allowing the buyer to purchase a more expensive home.63
Also, many buyers may not be able to meet a bank's requirements for lending
but may satisfy a seller's concerns because the seller may be more concerned
64
about selling the house than about how good the buyer's credit is.
C. Economics: Scholarly Perception and Ohio Reality
1. Scholarly Perception - The Land Contract as a Device of Last Resort
The land contract has generally been characterized as a financing device
of last resort used by low-income and other purchasers who are unable to obtain
conventional financing. Professor Mixon, in his study of land contract transactions in Houston, Texas, 65 took the position that many residential land contracts involve purchase of low-priced houses with little or no down payment
by marginally solvent vendees.6 Professor Mixon concluded from his data that
the land contract and the forfeiture remedy well served the purposes of both
the vendor and vendee; the vendee was able to purchase a house that he could
not finance commercially6 7 and the vendor was encouraged to sell the house
because if the "risky" vendee defaulted the vendor would be able to both retain
the payments made by the vendee and get back unencumbered title to the
house.68
"See infra text accompanying note 88 for origin of this interest rate.
"See supra note 53.
"0A "point" is usually a loan charge of I1o of the loan amount. Congress treats points as pre-paid interest.
I.R.C. § 461(g) (West 1978). The payment of points incurred in connection with the purchase of the taxpayers'
principal residence is generally deductible in the year paid. Id.
"Dayton Area Mortgage Rates, Dayton Daily News, Dec. 27, 1981, at 9-E, col. 4.
"See infra chart in text accompanying note 90.
"The higher the monthly mortgage or land contract payment, the more the buyer needs to earn.
"'The seller may not require a specific income to payment ratio as a bank would, so the buyer might be
able to take on a higher payment on a more expensive house.
"Mixon, supra note 33.
"Id. at 554-55.
"Id. at 555.
6$Id
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Other commentators have also concluded that the land contract and
forfeiture remedy have a "saving" function. 9 In the 1950's the Legal Aspects
Subcommittee of the North Central Land Tenure Committee of the Farm Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, sponsored studies in several states on "How Young
Farmers Get Established in Farming." 70 The articles which resulted focused
primarily on how farmers purchased land, which frequently was found to be
by land contract. 7 ' As did Professor Mixon later, some of these commentators
concluded that the land contract was necessary for marginal purchasers; they
literally feared that but for the land contract and its forfeiture remedy, many
farmers would be unable to purchase land."
This view is unrealistic. It seems fair to assume that one sells land because
one either wants to or needs to. Certainly there must be some economic advantage to be gained by selling: the seller has purchased the land in order to resell
it; he desires to sell land which is no longer useful to him and is therefore not
worth the costs of ownership; he has obtained ownership involuntarily and either
wants to avoid the costs of ownership or profit by realizing its value in money;
or the land is still useful to him but he is unable to bear the costs of ownership. Regardless of the reason, the owner who offers his property for sale wants
to sell it and, if he can find a buyer, will do so no matter how the buyer is
able to pay the purchase price. Land contracts are therefore neither legally nor
economically "necessary."
Two arguments have been made against the view that sales will occur
regardless of the availability of land contracts. Both arguments can be overcome. The first argument is that if buyers are unable to obtain other financing,
the only way the seller will sell his property is by financing the purchase himself,
presumably through a land contract. However, a seller-offered mortgage
provides everything a land contract does except the remedy of forfeiture.I3 The
second argument is illustrated by Professor Mixon's example of the developer
who buys unimproved land by means of a conventional mortgage, intending
to subdivide it, build cheap houses on the lots, and sell the houses by land
contract to low-income persons."' Although, arguably, the developer would
be reluctant to go forward with the subdivision without being able to declare
a forfeiture, it seems indisputable that since the developer is undertaking the
"See Clark, Installment Land Contracts in South Dakota, Part 1, 6 S.D.L. REV. 248 (1961); Clark &
Richards, Installment Land Contracts in South Dakota, Part II, 7 S.D.L. REV. 44 (1962); Dolson, A
Comparisonof Land Contracts and Other Security Devices in Kentucky, 32 U. CIN. L. REV. 435 (1963);
Dolson & Zile, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 383; Hines, Forfeiture
of Installment Land Contracts, 12 U. KAN. L. REV. 475 (1964).
"See Beuscher, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts - A Preface, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 379.
'Clark, supra note 69, at 270; Dolson & Zile, supra note 69, at 386; Hines, supra note 69, at 477.
"1Clark, supra note 69, at 252; Hines, supra note 69, at 492.
3See supra note 43.
"Mixon bases part of his analysis on the situations where a developer has a blanket mortgage on an entire
subdivision and then enters into land contracts on the individual lots. Mixon, supra note 33, at 546.
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subdivision for profit he too will find a way to realize his profit, with or without

forfeiture.
The economic reality, as will be illustrated in the next section of the article,
is even stronger than the theoretical counterarguments given above. In both
of these cases, the sole difference between using a seller-offered mortgage and
75
a land contract is the remedy of forfeiture. The matter then becomes a question of policy. Should we allow sales of property where one of the bases of
the sales is the ability of the seller to declare a forfeiture of the buyer's interest?
76
The equity courts, at least in mortgage law, have answered a resounding "No!"
That answer may be too absolute, however, particularly if the inquiry is qualified
by adding "regardless of whether the buyer's interest is one worth protecting."
If we require an evaluation of the buyer's interest, the availability of the drastic
remedy of forfeiture is even more important in determining the equity and
ultimate utility of land contracts. The final answer must lie in determining what
interests are being protected and what interests should be protected.
2. Ohio Reality
The perception that land contracts will be most often used as a low-income
financing device is shattered when one considers the economics of the current
use of land contracts in Ohio. In order to test that perception the author undertook a study of land contracts recorded in 1981 in Montgomery County, Ohio,
designed to determine when Ohio buyers and sellers were using land contracts."
At the outset, the myth that the land contract is a low-income financing
device is disproven by the study. The median purchase price for a house sold
by land contract in Dayton in 1981 was $46,000.78 In the inflated housing costs
of the 1980's, this may not seem very much, but, for example, it is not that
much below the median selling price for houses in Dayton in 1981 of $54,680.11
However, the study also showed a range of purchase prices from $3,000, clearly
0
low-income, to $500,000, clearly not low-income, with 37% at $60,000 or
"See supra note 43.
"See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
"The statistics contained infra in the text accompanying notes 74-89 are drawn from a study undertaken
by the author and his research assistant, Robin Ames. The study consisted of a review of approximately
10%1/of the land contracts recorded in Montgomery County, Ohio, in 1981. Dayton is the principal city
in Montgomery County and the fourth largest city in Ohio. Montgomery County was chosen because Dayton
is a fairly average Ohio city, and the remainder of the county consists of urban, suburban and rual areas.
It was first determined that 2069 land contracts were recorded in Montgomery County in 1981 nand
that a 10% sampling would give a fairly accurate representation as to the terms of those contracts. Next
it was determined how many contracts were recorded in each month of 1981 and approximately 10% of
that number were chosen at random. The following four characteristics were determined as to each contract
examined: purchase price, down payment, stated interest rate, and lenght of time the contract would be
in effect if not prepaid. Each monthly sample was random. Once a land contract was chosen on an index,
which only identified it as a land contract and when it was recorded, that land contract was included in
the sample regardless of its terms. The raw data on the 200 land contracts studied is set forth in tabular
form as Appendix A at the end of this article.
"See supra note 77 and infra Appendix A.
"DAYTON AREA BOARD OF REALTORS, 1981 COMPOSITE COMPARABLE SALES INDEX BOOK (1982).
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higher, 15.5% at $80,000 or higher, and 8.5% at $100,000 or higher."
The study showed, in addition, that labeling Ohio land contracts "longterm" is a misnomer. The median term for the land contracts studied was a
mere three and one-half years, 2 hardly long-term when compared to the
standard commercial mortgage term of thirty years. 3 Even more striking was
that only 15.5% had terms of over five years, only 9% had terms of over ten
years, and a mere 3% had terms of thirty years. 4
The median down payment made on the land contracts studied was also
interesting. For all the contracts studied the median down payment was about
14% of the purchase price.8 5 No matter how it is broken down, the median
down payment stayed below 20%. For instance, if one isolates down payment
according to term, those with terms above the three and one-half year median
term have a median down payment of 15%, while those with terms below the
median term have a median down payment of 16%, and those with no stated
terms have a median down payment of 12%.86 There is some difference if one
isolates down payment by purchase price, but the median down payments are still
less than 20%; those with purchase prices above the $46,000 median purchase
price have a median down payment of 18%, while those with purchase prices
below the $46,000 median purchase price have a median down payment of 12%.87
One additional factor, interest rate, needs to be added to complete the
picture. The median stated interest rate of the land contracts studied is 110.88
This is far below the commercial mortgage rate prevailing in the Dayton market
in 1981 of 15.5% to 18%.9
The best way to understand the importance of owner-financing, especially
the land contract, in the market is to look at a concrete example. Take the
"median" house, $46,000, and consider how the transaction looked to the 1981
home buyer in two situations: if he borrowed from a bank or if the seller and
he entered into a land contract.

'Appendix A.

"Appendix A. For purposes of establishing a median term the 37 land contracts which did not state terms
were excluded. If one includes those 37 by assigning them terms of zero years, the median term is three years.
"In the last several decades mortgage terms have increased from 15 or 20 years to 30 years or longer,
with the 30 year mortgage firmly in place for at least the last 30 years.
"Appendix A. No land contract studied had a term of over 30 years, the typical length for commercial
first mortgages.
"Appendix A.
"Appendix A. See supra note 82 for a dicsussion of how land contracts with no stated term were treated
in establishing the three and one-half year median term for the land contracts studied.
"Appendix A.
"Appendix A.
"See supra note 53.
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Comparison of Bank Mortgage to Amortized and Interest-Only
Land Contracts9"

Purchase Price
Down Payment
Balance
Interest Rate
Monthly Payment

Bank Financed
(30 year
amortized)

Land Contract
Land Contract
(30 year amortized, (Interest only,
3.5 year balloon)
3.5 year balloon)

$46,000
$ 9,200 (20%)
$36,800
16%'o
$524.73

$46,000
$ 6,440 (14%)
$39,560
11%°o
$376.73

$46,000
$ 6,440 (14%)
$39,560
11%
$362.63

There was a tremendous economic incentive for the buyer to prefer a land
contract, for he would dramatically reduce his monthly cost of housing and
avoid the high initial costs of obtaining a commercial loan, avoiding points,
loan fees, 91 and, if he desired, a title insurance premium or the cost of a title
abstract. However, the "median" land contract buyer was taking one substantial
risk in that within three and one-half years he would have to pay off the land
contract in full with his own funds, convince the seller to extend the land condefaulting.
tract, obtain commercial financing, sell the house, or be faced with
92 it is a substanNo matter what reason a vendee may give for taking such a risk,
tial one, 93 regardless of a vendor's remedy. The vendee's default is serious in
any case, but forfeiture can make it catastrophic.
If we assume that default is a possibility, consider where the "median"
vendee placed himself. At the end of the three and one-half year term, he will
still not have paid 20% of the purchase price, even with a thirty-year amortized
9
land contract with a three and one-half year balloon. " The "median" Ohio
vendee is therefore beyond the reach of mandatory foreclosure, and the vendor
95
is given the option of seeking forfeiture and damages.
The study shows that the situations of most current Ohio land contract
vendees, at all income ranges, fall outside of the requirements for mandatory
foreclosure of land contracts contained in the Act. With land contracts being
interest rate
"All figures for the land contracts are derived from medians in the study. The commercial
charts.
is a "best guess" average for 1981. Monthly payments are derived from standard amortization
"See supra note 60.
"The reasons a vendee might give include planning to move and sell or refinance commercially when interest
rates drop.
St. J.,
"Rotbart & Yas, Record Level of Home Foreclosures is Bringing Grief to Many Families, Wall
June 15, 1982, at 23, col. 3.
in the
"He will have paid 15.6% or $7,159, the original $6,440 down payment plus $719 in principal,
made.
have
will
he
42 monthly payments
"See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08 (Page 1981), and supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
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used as bridges of finite length over a period of high interest rates of potentially infinite duration, it seems safe to predict that some vendees may see their
"bridges" collapse and be unable to deal financially with the consequences. 9"
Further, the interests of these vendees may be substantial, for example, those
1981 vendees who paid between $46,000 and $500,000 and whose median down
payment was 8IN. 97 These are clearly interests worth protecting, and Ohio
land contract law appears on its face to leave them unprotected.

III.

COMMON LAW AND MODERN TRENDS

Ohio is not the only jurisdiction to give less than full
contract vendees. Forfeiture is neither a new nor a solely
The purpose of this section is to survey the origins of the
and the approaches currently being taken by states other
looking more thoroughly at Ohio law.

protection to land
statutory remedy.
forfeiture concept
than Ohio before

A. Common Law
Trying to determine what is the "common law" of forfeiture is a difficult
task because the concept of forfeiture lacks easily identifiable roots in the
common law and contradicts most legal and equitable concepts of both contract and property law. 8 It is difficult to dismiss forfeiture as merely an aberration of the common law because it has persisted for two centuries and, at
least as a point of departure for courts, it is still alive and well in many states.99
Further, it is hard to call a concept an abberation when it has engendered
numerous law review articles, notes and comments, and chapters in treatises.' °0
The origin of allowing forfeiture of land contracts is unclear. Although
twentieth century commentators uniformly decry forfeiture,'"' earlier courts
clearly took a contrary view in initially allowing forfeiture. One commentator
lays the blame on the English courts and the policy determination by Lord Eldon
that "time might be made the essence of a contract."'0 2 To this apparent preclusion of equitable considerations, the commentator contends, opportunistic vendors coupled acceleration, which resulted in vendees' having their real property

"See Rotbart and Yas, supra note 93.
"See Appendix A, and supra text accompanying note 87.
"These concepts include, for example, the maxim "equity abhors a forfeiture," and the idea that damages
provided at the inception of a contract, so-called liquidated damages, be reasonably calculated to reflect
the damage a party will suffer upon breach.
"Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 544.
"'Inaddition to the previously cited article by Professors Nelson and Whitman, supra note 22, at least
36 articles, notes and comments have been published since 1921 which deal in detail with forfeiture. In
addition, several of the dominant minds in contract law turned their attention to land contract forfeitures
in their treatises. See, e.g., 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1075, 1098-1098A (1964); 5 S.
WILLISTON. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 791-792 (3d ed. 1961).
r0'5

A. CORBIN, supra note 100, § 1098A, at 537; 5 S.

WILLISTON,

supra note 100, § 792, at 776.

"'Levin, Maryland Rule on Forfeiture Under Land Installment Contracts.
MD. L. REV. 99, 108 (1948).
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interests and credit for payments made taken from them by their failure to
1 3
make payments in a timely manner. " The result is forfeiture.
Perhaps the clearest explanation that can be made for this rather shocking decision of the equity courts to literally construe contract terms allowing
forfeiture, thereby greatly benefiting one party to the severe detriment of
another, was offered by Professor Simpson in his article on equitable
conversion:°
The doctrine that equity will enforce forteiture provisions in land contracts where time is expressly made of the essence developed in this coun05
try during the latter half of the nineteenth century, at a time when extreme ideas as to "freedom of contract" were influencing American0judicial
7
decisions in every field.30 6 It was a time when equity was decadent, when
30 8
laissez faire was almost an article of judicial faith, and when the courts
were thinking in terms of free-willing individuals entirely able to look after
themselves rather than in terms either of classical equity or of a socialized
law taking a realistic account of inequalities of economic position and
bargaining power. The ecclesiastical chancellor who granted relief to a
plaintiff who had not taken care to follow the prescribed rules as to covenants because "Deus est procurator fatuorum,''309 ["God takes care of
fools"] the classical chancellor who created the equity of redemption in
the face of the strict law310 and who said that "necessitous men are not
. . . free men,'' 3 11 had given place to judges who regarded individual
freedom of contract as fundamental in any civilized system of law and
enforced the harshest of contract provisions without hesitation or searching
of conscience unless constrained by binding precedent to relieve against
12
them. The court of conscience had become a court strictissimi juris ["Of
the strictest law"]. In such an atmosphere, it was easy enough to put aside
the tradition that equity would not enforce a forteiture except insofar as
1031d.

'o'Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, 44 YALE L.J. 754,
by
776-77 (1935). The footnotes are numbered as in the original text. The Latin translations were added
this author. Following are the footnotes from the original text:
I 'Compare Heckard v. Sayre, 34 111. 142 (1864) with Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige 352 (N.Y. 1844)
'6See Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L.J. 454. Cf. Jennings, Freedom of ContractInquiries and Speculations (1934) 22 CALIF L. REV. 636.
"°'See Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REV. 20.
"See note 306, supra. Cf. Homes, J., dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
"George Neville, Bishop of Exeter, L.C., in Y.B. Pasch, 8 EDW. IV, f., pl. 11 (1467); see
Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence(1908) 24 L.Q. REV. 373,
380.
"'°See 5 HODSWORTH. op. cit. supra note 298, at 330.
"Lord Northington, L.C., in Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113 (Ch. 1762).
112Cp. Buckley, J.,in In re Telescriptor Syndicate, Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 174; 195: "This Court is
not a court of conscience." For a very recent example of this tendency, see Graf v. Hope Bldg.
Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930); and cf. the comment on that case in (1930) 79 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 229, 231.
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that tradition had been embalmed in direct precedents, and to develop
a line of decisions holding that contracts for the sale of land which expressly made time of the essence and provided for the forteiture of all
payments theretofore made in the event of default would be enforced
according to their literal terms," ' especially where prompt payment of
all installments was made an express "condition precedent" to the
purchaser's rights under the contract.
Although Professor Simpson was primarily concerned with the concept
that some incident of title is equitably converted to a land contract vendee,
his thoughts still include an eloquent explanation and damnation of the forfeiture
remedy. Simpson's answer to the problem of forfeiture was quite simple; he
believed the only remedy was legislation because the equity courts had failed
to do their job.' 5
One can lay blame for enforcement of land contract forfeitures on the
courts, as most commentators have, 01 6 but the scholars cannot escape all blame;
it was the scholars who furthered the doctrine of freedom of contract which
was the theoretical basis for allowing the forfeiture remedy.I 7 The courts may
be blamed for failing to use equitable considerations in determining whether
to grant forfeiture and rigidly adhering to strict forfeiture. Even if a court denied
the vendee any further interest under the defaulted-upon land contract by allowing forfeiture, it was not precluded from using a quasi-contract concept, such
as quantum meruit, to give relief to the vendee if the vendor had gained an
unfair position through forfeiture.' 0 8 Unfortunately, however, the majority of
early courts denied the vendee any relief.' 9
An even more objectionable attitude of some courts toward defaulting
vendees was that a vendee in default solely because of his failure to pay was
entitled to nothing."l 0 The greatest abuse in applying forfeiture in this kneejerk manner was that many courts granted forfeiture upon any default by a
vendee whether or not there was a forfeiture clause in the land contract. "' This
carries freedom of contract so far that it psychologically strips the equity court
of its equitable power.
3

'Some of these decisions have resulted in shocking hardship on the purchaser. See, e.g., Iowa
Rr. Land Co. v. Mickel, 41 Iowa 402 (1875); Heckard v. Sayre, 34 111.142 (1864); Nelson Real
Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W. 227 (1920); Brown v. Ulrich, 48 Neb. 409,
67 N.W. 168 (1896); Doctorman v. Schroeder, 92 N.J. Eq. 676, 114 At. 810 (1921).
"'Simpson, supra note 104, at 777.
"'E.g., OSBORNE,supra note 33, § 3.26; S. WILLISTON,Supra note 100, § 791; Ballantine, Forfeiturefor
Breach of Contract, 5 MiNN. L. REV. 329, 345 (1921); Levin, supra note 102, at 108; Vanneman, Strict
Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-46 (1930).
'°'Simpson, supra note 104, at 776.
'"Bodenheimer, Forfeiture Under Real Estate Installment Contractsin Utah, 3 UTAH L. REV. 30, 32 (1952).
1I9d.

"Old. at 33.
111d_
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No matter what theoretical basis is used, forfeiture became the black letter
law of land contract defaults during the nineteenth century. Perhaps because
of the scholarly objection to forfeiture, or its glaring inequity, the black letter
law was quickly eroded by exceptions.
B. Modern Trends
In evaluating the current law on land contract defaults, the concept of
forfeiture "at best serves as a point of departure."" 2 There is no way to point
to any consistent trend among the states. ",3 "Not only does the law vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but within any one state results may vary depending
upon the type of action brought, the exact terms of the land contract, and the
facts of the particular case." 1 4 The trend is away from strict forfeiture, however.
The states can be divided into three categories based on their treatment of
forfeiture: 1. statutory forfeiture with clear requirements for notice and a period
for reinstatement by the vendee; 2. statutory abolition of forfeiture, either express or judicially implied, and treatment of land contracts as mortgages; and
3. equitable judicial action allowing the remedies of reinstatement, vendee's
recovery of damages, vendee's redemption, or requiring foreclosure as if a
mortgage in appropriate cases." 5
1. Statutory Forfeiture
One legislative response to the inequity of strict forfeiture is to regulate
forfeiture, thereby making the vendor give effective notice to the vendee and
giving the vendee the ability to cure a default and reinstate the contract."1 6 Professors Nelson and Whitman suggest that the Iowa statute is "the best example
of this type of legislation.'"II
Section 656.1 of the Code of Iowa prohibits land contract forfeitures unless
there has been compliance with the statutory procedure for notice of the right
of reinstatement."' 8 Section 656.2 of the Code of Iowa provides, in relevant
part: III
Such forfeiture and cancellation shall be initiated by the vendor ... by
serving . . . on the vendee . . . a written notice which shall:
1. Reasonably identify said contract, and accurately describe the real
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 543.
1 31d.
"'Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 416 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
'Ohio has chosen to follow none of the three courses completely. By allowing forfeiture after only a
10 day period for reinstatement, and without redemption or vendee recovery of damages, for some land
contracts and treating others as mortgages, Ohio has chosen both one of the more restrictive and one of
the most liberal views possible, depending on the economics of the transaction. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5313.07 (Page 1981).
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 544.
"'ld.
"'IOWA CODE ANN. § 656.1 (West 1950).
.'.IOWA CODE ANN. § 656.2 (West 1950 and Supp. 1981-82).
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estate covered thereby.
2. Specify the terms and conditions of said contract which have not been
complied with.
3. Notify said party that said contract will stand forfeited and canceled
unless said party within thirty days . . . performs the terms and
conditions in default, and, in addition, pays the reasonable costs of
serving the notice.
Several other states have similar statutes in which the reinstatement period varies,
with the longest being one year in North Dakota. I 0 For example, Ohio appears
to have one of the shortest periods for reinstatement; the right of the vendee
to reinstate is absolute for thirty days after a default, but thirty days after that
default occurs the vendor may send a notice to the vendee which limits the
further right to reinstate to ten more days."'
The statutory reinstatement period obviously lessens the harshness of strict
forfeiture; rather than having the draconian result of "miss a payment, out
you go," the vendee is given at least some time to pay what is due and regain
good standing to continue with the land contract. On the negative side, Professors Nelson and Whitman contend that courts have allowed statutes to formalize the forfeiture concept with many courts in states with statutory forfeiture
appearing constrained from using their equitable powers to lessen the harshness
12 2
of a better, but still drastic, requirement of "pay up after notice or else."'
Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court of Iowa has recently stated that
although it will usually enforce forfeiture when the vendor strictly complies
with the statute, equitable considerations are still appropriate. In Jensen v.
Schreck,12 3 a case involving a joint venture in which real estate was purchased
by land contract, the court, in deciding the case, considered as a factor the
amount paid on the contract by the vendee. 12 Although the defendants in the
forfeiture action, the Schrecks, made a $1,000 down payment on a $56,000
purchase price and had made $1,914.79 in improvements, the court allowed
forfeiture by analogizing the amount retained to liquidated damages and deciding
that the amount of "liquidated damages" was reasonable. 5 Although the court
did grant forfeiture, the court showed that it recognized its obligation to "do
equity" even in the face of a "mandatory" statute.
Another interesting point raised by Professors Nelson and Whitman is that
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 544. Note 8 on p. 544 lists three statutes: MINN. STATE. ANN.
§ 559.21 (West Supp. 1977) (amended 1980, now in West Supp. 1982), N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to
-06 (1976), and S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 21-50-01 to -07 (1967).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05-06 (Page 1981).
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 545.
3275 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1979).
"'Id. at 386-87.
"'Id. at 387. The liquidated damages rationale is clearly fallacious, however, as there has been no effort
to approximate the vendor's actual damages. See 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 100; Simpson, supra note
104, at 775.
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these statutory schemes closely resemble strict foreclosure in that the vendee
in default is, like the mortgagor in default, given one last chance to save his
interest in the property. 12 6 The difference between the two is that the mortgagor
has a right of redemption exercisable by paying the entire outstanding balance
on the mortgage, thereby discharging it, where the land contract vendee under
these statutes merely has to pay all sums previously not paid and is then able
27
to continue paying future installments on the land contract as they come due.'
The ability to reinstate appears to give the land contract vendee an advantage
the mortgagor does not have until one considers that strict foreclosure is rarely
allowed; almost all foreclosures are by sale,' 2 s public or private. Therefore the
more accurate comparison is between the mortgagee who has a right to a neutral
sale of the property and the land contract vendee who loses the property along
with his payments and improvements.
2. Abolition of Forfeiture
Forfeiture has been abolished in several states, both directly and indirectly.
The most direct statute abolishing forfeiture appears to be Oklahoma's:
All contracts for deed for purchase and sale of real property made
for the purpose or with the intention of receiving the payment of money
and made for the purpose of establishing an immediate and continuing
right of possession of the described real property, whether such instruments
be from the debtor to the creditor or from the debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor, shall to that extent be deemed and held
mortgages, and shall be subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to
the same regulation, restraints and forms as are prescribed in relation to
.129
mortgages ..
The statute is even more striking because foreclosure in Oklahoma may only
be accomplished by judicial action.' 30 Maryland takes the same position as
Oklahoma in the sale of residential property by land contract to a noncorporate
vendee.' ' In all other cases, common law forfeiture presumably is available
in Maryland.' 32
Kentucky and Indiana'3 3 have taken direct judicial approaches. In Sebastian
v. Floyd,' the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that foreclosure of a land
contract as if it were a mortgage is a vendor's only remedy upon default by
the vendee. While being careful to distinguish the long-term installment con" 6Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 545.
127Id.

supra note 33, § 1.4.
'29OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 16 § I1A (West Supp. 1981-82).

128OSBORNE,

§ 686

(West 1960).
§§ 10-101 to -108 (1981).
"Nelsor & Whitman, supra note 22, at 546.
"'Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979); Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973).
-"585 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Ky. 1979).
"OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 12,

"'MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
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tract before it from an "executory deposit receipt agreement,"' 3 5 the court stated:
There is no practical distinction between the land sale contract and a purchase money mortgage, in which the seller conveys legal title to the buyer
but retains a lien on the property to secure payment. The significant feature
of each device is the seller's financing the buyer's purchase of the property, using the property as collateral for the loan . . .
The modern trend is for courts to treat land sales contracts as
analogous to conventional mortgages, thus requiring a seller to seek a
judicial sale of the property upon the buyer's default.' 36
Sebastian is now clearly the rule of law in Kentucky.'
California, in the inimitable way it has in real estate finance matters,' 3 8
has taken a statute that appears to allow forfeiture in some cases and interpreted it as prohibiting forfeiture. I" Section 3275 of the California Civil Code
provides as follows:
Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a
forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure
to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making
full compensation to the other party, except in the case of a grossly
negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.' °
Despite section 3275, the California courts routinely allowed forfeiture of land
contracts until 1949 when the California Supreme Court decided Barkis v.
Scott. '41 In Barkis, a case involving sale of a house, the court concluded that
at most the vendee's default was the result of simple negligence, rather than
gross negligence, fraud, or willfull act, and the vendee was therefore entitled
4 2
to avoid forfeiture.'
Even when confronted with the "wilfull, but repentant vendee" in
MacFadden v. Walker, 141 the California Supreme Court still refused to allow
forfeiture. The vendee, an older woman, had been in default for over two years
but was willing to pay the balance of the purchase price after her vendor sought
forfeiture. By tying section 3275 to several other Civil Code sections involving

"'Id. at 383.
3Jld.

"'See Gamble v. Bryant, 599 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
"'See generally Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr.
18, (1966); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
'"Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 CAL. L. REV. 729, 733 (1960); Nelson & Whitman, supra
note 22, at 553.
"'CAL. CIv. CODE § 3275 (West 1970).
'34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949). See also Hetland, supra note 139, at 732; Nelson & Whitman,
supra note 22, at 553.
"34 Cal. 2d at 123, 208 P.2d at 372.
"5 Cal. 3d 809, 815, 488 P.2d 1353, 1356, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1971).
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5
punitive damages,'" liquidated damages,1 4 and prohibition of specific perfor14 6
mance of a forfeiture, the court concluded that the only fair result was to
47
grant specific performance to the then willing vendee.' In so holding, the court
48
rejected Profesor Hetland's strong plea for mandatory foreclosure' and left
the question of how it would treat forfeiture, if granted, to its prior jumble
of holdings, including its rather oblique reference in Honey v. Henry's Franchise
Leasing Corp. 9 to foreclosure at the choice of either the vendor or the vendee.
California appears to have the most elaborately developed law on the rights
5
of land contract vendees and vendors. oForfeiture can be avoided by a vendee
by either paying the amount in default or requesting foreclosure.'

3. Equitable Judicial Action
Professors Nelson and Whitman suggest four ways in which courts have
acted to avoid or mitigate the harshness of forfeiture: 1) waiver by the vendor;
52
2) redemption by the vendee; 3) restitution; and 4) foreclosure.' These four
concepts are obviously not exclusive, and they overlap with the two previously
discussed topics, statutory forfeiture and abolition of forfeiture. For example,
Iowa, a statutory forfeiture state, has indicated a willingness to allow equitable
relief from statutory forfeiture.' 53 On the other hand, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has abolished forfeiture and imposed foreclosure in all cases without
any statutory basis.' 5 4 In both Iowa and Kentucky, then, the point of departure
is not common law forfeiture. The difference is that the courts which start with
common law forfeiture and take a case by case approach may choose to allow
or the
forfeiture, or to deny it because the forfeiture clause is unreasonable
5
forfeiture.'
allow
to
unfair
be
situation is such that it would
a.. Waiver
Waiver is perhaps the easiest for a court to find. Few vendors have not
56
accepted at least one, and perhaps many, payments after they were due.'
Ultimately the vendor tires of the late payments and declares the land contract
"CAL. CIv. CODE
"'CAL.

CIv.

CODE

§ 3294 (West 1970) (current version at CAL. CIV.
§§ 1670-1671 (West 1973) (current version at

CAL.

CODE

CIv.

§ 3294 (West Supp. 1982)).

CODE

§ 1671(b), (d) (West Supp.

1982)).
"6CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3369 (West 1970) (current version at

CAL. CIV CODE

§ 3369 (West Supp. 1982)).

"5 Cal. 3d at 815, 488 P.2d at 1357, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
"Id. at 816, 488 P.2d at 1357, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (citing J. HETLAND, CAL. REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS §§ 3.58-.81 (1970)).
'"64 Cal. 2d 801, 805, 415 P.2d 833, 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1966). See also Ward v. Union Bond
& Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 559.
supra note 33, § 328, at 95.
" Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 547-62.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
1"See supra text accompanaying notes 133-37.
"'OSBORNE.

"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 547.
"'Id. at 548.
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forfeited. In response to the vendor's suit, or in the vendee's suit for specific

performance, the vendee may ask for either reinstatement or specific
performance, ' arguing that the vendor has waived his right to forfeiture by
not requiring strict compliance with the land contract.
As might be expected when courts apply equitable principles on a case
by case basis, cases involving waiver are difficult to reconcile., 58 Two judges
given the same facts will, inevitably, come to different conclusions at least some
of the time. Given the wide range of views concerning forfeiture,' 5 9 which increases the likelihood of disagreement, there will be inconsistencies. "In some
cases rather innocuous forebearances by vendors have been translated into
favorable holdings for purchasers, while in others quite substantial leniency
has been unavailing."

60

Professors Nelson and Whitman' 6' refer to an interesting Utah case, Pacific
Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 162 as an example. During the first two years of a land
contract the vendee missed some payments and made others after they were
due. The vendor demanded that payments on the contract be made current
but also said no forefeiture was then being considered. In the vendor's suit
for forfeiture the trial court said that strict performance of the contract had
been waived. The Utah Supreme Court, however, granted forfeiture because
the vendees had had ample time to bring payments current and "[Tihey had
not paid the equivalent of the rental value of the property for the time they
occupied it.'

' 3

In effect, although there had been waiver, the vendees had

not acted to help themselves. As Professors Nelson and Whitman so charitably
put it, "The court may have been confusing the waiver concept with the principle of equitable relief from forfeiture." 6
b. Redemption and Restitution
Redemption by and restitution to the vendee are truly equitable remedies.
With these remedies the courts are directly considering the fairness of forfeiture,
while with the concept of waiver they are considering the actions or inactions
of the parties apart from the ultimate fairness of forfeiture.
We have already seen the California courts allow redemption in Barkis
"'Id. In using the term "specific performance," one could just as easily use "redemption"; after all,
what the vendee wants to do is tender the full contract price in exchange for a deed from the vendor.
As Professors Nelson and Whitman correctly point out, however, since the claim for redemption is based
on waiver, it is clearly different from the situation where the court offers the vendee a redemption period
after granting the vendor's forfeiture action. Id. at 550.

"'Id. at 549.

" See supra text accompanying notes 104-1I; 133-51.
""Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 549.
,6,Id.
'61113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).

"'Id. at 409, 195 P.2d at 751.
'"Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 550 n.28.
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66
v. Scott' 65 and McFadden v. Walker. Although those cases were obstensibly
1 67
one could just as easily base the same conclusions on
based on a statute,
the legal maxim "equity abhors a forfeiture." It seems logical that, almost
regardless of the prior activity of the vendee, if the vendee is now willing to
pay to the vendor the balance due on the land contract a court should let him.

After all, assuming the vendor has not been damaged in a way which cannot
be compensated for monetarily, if the vendee is allowed to pay the parties
want; the vendor gets all his money and the
will each get what they should
68
vendee gets the property.'
Restitution is in a somewhat different position as a remedy in that the
vendee sues the vendor. Waiver, redemption, and foreclosure are all logically
grouped. Waiver is not inconsistent with forfeiture as it is69a contract principle
and forfeiture is arguably a freedom of contract concept. Redemption is very
close because it literally puts the parties where they had decided they wanted
to be.' 70 Foreclosure puts control in the vendor, the wronged party, for collection of his money. "' Restitution does not logically fit, as the vendee is able
to obtain damages from the vendor and the parties are not put where they
bargained to be. However, some courts that do not allow redemption or
foreclosure are allowing resitution suits by vendees.'"
The problem in restitution suits is how to determine what the vendee's
damages are. The courts have suggested several different factors that might
affect how much, if any, is awarded to the vendee: the fair rental value of
74
the premises, 7 3 the amount paid to the vendor,' and the change7 5 in value of
the premises between the inception of the contract and default. Professors
Nelson and Whitman also quite correctly suggest that the time value of money
should affect the amount of damages; however, apparently no court has adopted
their position.' 76
Several states, most notably Utah and Florida, have been concerned with
to the vendee.7
determining "unconscionability" before allowing restitution
"'See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
'"See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
"'CAL. CIv. CODE § 3275 (West 1970). See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
"'This view obviously rejects the freedom of contract position and looks at the parties independently.
After all, what the vendor should want is his money, and if he gets that plus interest and costs of collection,
why should the vendee be punished?
"'See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
"'This is an obvious contractual inconsistency because it denies the vendor the right to gain possession
of the property for his own use unless he buys it at the foreclosure sale.
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 554.
"'Id. at 555.
"'Ild.
"'Id. at 557.
"7Id.at 557, n.61.
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This appears to be irrational, both because requiring unconscionability means
that some aspect other than the vendee's damages must be unconscionable for
the vendee to collect damages and because the presence of damages means that
forfeiture is unconscionable. The first is irrational because the vendee's damages
are frequently going to be independent of other terms; in fact, the contract
and forfeiture of it may be completely fair in that no equities favor the vendee's
claim to the property, but for the vendee's damages. The second is tautological.
Although California courts do not consider unconscionability, they have
taken the awarding of vendees' damages to a fine art.'18 In Honey v. Henry's
FranchiseLeasing Corp., 7 the California Supreme Court held that the vendor could choose between two measures of the vendee's damages: 1) the excess of the vendee's payments on the contract over the fair rental value of the
premises during the time the vendee is in possession; or 2) the excess of the
vendee's payments on the contract over the difference between the contract
price and the value of the premises upon default (assuming a drop in value). "0
The court let the vendor choose because to let the vendee choose would be
to convert the land contract into a lease option, something a defaulter should'
not have the option to do.'"' Either way, the vendee cannot lose because if
the property has appreciated in value he can sell it and pay off the vendor,'8 2
and if he cannot sell the property, he may be able to force a foreclosure no
matter what the vendor desires. 8 3
Although there is no consistent direction being taken by other states, one
comment can be made with certainty: courts are reluctant to enforce forfeitures
rigidly. This background should provide a sufficient setting for considering
Ohio's approach to forfeiture and the policies favoring and opposing forfeiture.
IV.

OHIO RESIDENTIAL LAND CONTRACT LAW

At the outset it is important to note that Ohio's statutory regulation of
land contracts covers only Ohio real property "improved by virtue of a dwelling having been erected on the real property."'" In addition, from 1969-1980
the statute had the following limiting phrase at the end of it: "where the purchase price does not exceed thirty thousand dollars."'I This affected not only
301 So. 2d 820 (Fla. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1975). See also Nelson & Whitman,
supra note 22, at 555-56.
1'It is, however, clearly flawed fine art.
'764 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966).
"'Id. at 803, 415 P.2d at 834-35, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Professors Nelson and Whitman argue persuasively
that the court incorrectly ignores the true value of money in its calculations. Nelson & Whitman, supra
note 22, at 557, n.61.
"64 Cal. 2d at 804, 415 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
'See supra text accompanying notes 138-50.
"64 Cal. 2d at 805, 415 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
1'OHlO REV. CODEANN. § 5313.01(B) (Page 1981). Suffice it to say that no Ohio case has dealt with this
vaguely worded statute. The author assumes that this language was intended to refer to a single-family
residence.
(effective Nov. 25, 1969) (current version at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §23
"1'1969
OHIo LAWS 424, 424-301983
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remedies but the entire land contract statutory scheme.'" 6 By a 1980 amend-

ment to the statute which removed the $30,000 limitation,' 87 however, Ohio
land contracts have been neatly divided; the statute governs all land contracts
involving property with a dwelling on it and all other land contracts are governed

by case law.
A. Pre-1969 Residential and Current Non-Residential Land Contract Law
It is probably fair to say that Ohio's general land contract law looks a
good deal like that of other states which do not have statutes; the courts
acknowledge forfeiture as a possibility but only rarely strictly enforce forfeiture.
This was not always the case.

The courts in several early Ohio cases granted forfeiture to the vendors. 88
In Rummington v. Kelley'8 9 and Scott v. Fields,'9 0 two of the earliest Ohio
Supreme Court cases on the question, the default of the vendee in each case
was unexplained, but after forfeiture was declared each vendee offered to pay
the vendor the full amount due under the contract.' 9 ' Even though the court
allowed forfeiture in both cases, the decisions were not as strict as first appears
because in each case the vendee was in clear default for a lengthy period of
time and either had no equity or the vendor had offered to return at least part
of the amount paid by the vendee.
In Scott, the vendee was obligated to make a total of four payments, on
January 13, March 13, and June 13, 1835, and on January 13, 1836. The first
and second payments were timely made, but the vendee did not offer to make
the third payment until July 29, 1835, 45 days late. Since the vendor had sold
the property to another on July 21, 1835, he declined the offered payment and,
on both July 29 and August 1, 1835, he offered to return the second payment
to the vendee. The vendee declined, and on the date of the final payment,
January 13, 1836, he tendered the third and fourth payments along with interest,
which the vendor refused.
The court emphasized the contract aspects of the land contract in rejecting
the vendee's request for specific performance: "How, then, can it be said that
the complainant is entitled to a specific performance when he has been guilty
of a violation of his contract - a contract drawn with the most guarded precision and care, and intended to impose terms upon respondent as well as upon
himself?" 9 2 Despite this seemingly strict approach to forfeiture, it is impossi§ 5313.01 is the definitional section for Chapter 5313.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
"'See, e.g., Campbell v. Hicks, 19 Ohio St. 433 (1869); Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 327 (1853);
Rummington v. Kelley, 7 Ohio 97 (1836); Scott v. Fields, 7 Ohio 91 (1836).
'7 Ohio 97 (1836).
907 Ohio 91 (1836).
116OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

"'Interestingly, in each case the plaintiff was the vendee. It appears that the vendors were satisfied with
merely declaring forfeiture and it was the vendees who sued for specific performance.
927 Ohio at 96.
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ble to guess the extent to which the court was influenced by the vendor's fulfillment of all terms of the contract and his offer to return the second payment
made by the vendee. The court ended its opinion by juxtaposing strictness and
equity:
On the whole, the conclusion to which we are brought is, that the
parties have made time of the essence of this contract that the complainant has violated the agreement by failing to pay the third installment,
and the bill is therefore dismissed, but with a decree for the payment back
of the second installment, since that also was the stipulation of the
parties. ,93
In Rummington the purchase price was to be paid in four annual installments, the first being due one year after the inception of the contract; there
was no down payment. The vendee failed to make the first payment and the
vendor, two or three weeks later, informed the vendee that the contract was
forfeited. The vendee tendered the first payment eleven months after it was
due, and the vendor refused it. The vendee tendered the entire amount due
under the contract four years after the inception of the contract on the date
the fourth and final installment was to be due and the vendor refused it. In
the interim, the vendee made what he termed "lasting and valuable improvements upon the land."' 9
In deciding the case, the court looked to several facts:' 95
1. The vendee never complied with the contract;
2. The vendor had promptly notified the vendee of forfeiture;
3. The property was vacant land; and
4. The improvements were made after the vendor had declared forfeiture
and while the vendor was absent from the area where the property
was located.
So again, despite the appearance of strict application of forfeiture, the court
was dealing with a vendee it termed "to have been guilty of gross and culpable
negligence," 9 6 who had never tendered a prompt payment or made improvements while, in the court's mind, in rightful possession, and with a vendor
who had received nothing and who had promptly declared a forfeiture. As a
sidelight, the court in Rummington stated that a land contract was not to be
treated as a mortgage,' 9 7 a decision that was echoed in later Ohio land contract cases.' 98
"'Id.at 96-97.
'7 Ohio at 98.
"'Id. at 103-04.
"'Id. at 104.
19Id.
"'Contractors & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Cresap, 9 Ohio App. 73 (Hamilton Co. 1917); Economy Say. &
Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (Williams Co. 1957); Woloveck v. Schueler,
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1983
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19 OhiobyApp.
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Before the Ohio Supreme Court again directly addressed the question of
land contract forfeitures, the Ohio courts of appeals denied forfeiture in two
cases. In the 1919 case of Curtis v. Factory Site Co., 99 one court of appeals
found that because the vendor had accepted late payments he had waived the
right to forfeiture. In the 1922 case of Woloveck v. Schueler,2°° another court
of appeals denied forfeiture on the ground that the vendor was unable to convey clear title. The court of appeals in Woloveck termed the trial court's order
to be "unjust, harsh and oppressive" since the vendees had been given six weeks
to pay or have their interest forfeited, even though the vendor had already lost
a suit with a third party who had established a "substantial interest in the
property. ' 21 ' The Woloveck court was quite willing to allow foreclosure,
however, stating:
Some courts of equity have held that the provision of forfeiture in
land contracts, the relation of the parties being so similar to that of
mortgagor and mortgagee, will not be enforced by strict foreclosure, but
that in land contracts, as in mortgages, if the defaulting party fails to
pay at the time set by the court, instead of cutting off the rights of the
vendee under the contract the property will be ordered sold as upon
foreclosure.
While it cannot be said that the weight of authority sustains this proposition, we believe it to be equitable and sound. 2
To this modest beginning the Ohio Supreme Court added one more interpretation before the courts of appeals began actively fashioning the case law
which controls nonresidential Ohio land contracts today. The most cited Ohio
Supreme Court case in this area is the 1923 case of Norpac Realty Co. v.
Schackne,20 3 where the vendee made a $12,500 down payment on a $50,000
purchase price but failed to make further principal payments required by the
contract. The court allowed forfeiture, although it recognized that forfeiture
might not always be equitable:
Cases may arise where equity might intervene, as where the agreed or
stipulated damages are used as a guise to cover what would otherwise be
a penalty, and the amount agreed upon so unconscionably large that a
2 '
court of equity would not enforce it. This is not such a case.
The court went on to reject foreclosure as a remedy, saying "This was
'12 Ohio App. 148, 157 (Cuyahoga Co. 1919). This is a fascinating case involving very questionable
activity by The Factory Site Co., whose partners were the late Messrs. Squire, Sanders and Dempsey,
the founding partners of the huge multi-office law firm based in Cleveland, Ohio, which still bears their
names.
'19 Ohio App. 210 (Summit Co. 1922).
1"Id. at 220.
1"Id. at 223-24.
03107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923).
"'Id.at 429, 140 N.E. at 481.
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not the contract nor the intention expressed therein." 2 5 In justifying the $12,500
down payment as liquidated damages, the court acknowledged that the sum
was "large, considered in proportion to the agreed price, but it was not so
disproportionate, to extravagantly unreasonable, or so manifestly unjust as to
require equitable interference with the contract agreed to. The parties could
contract for liquidated damages, as they did. .... "206 Despite the vagueness
of this language, which has been described as the Norpac "qualification test," 2 7
many courts of appeals cases, both those that have upheld forfeiture0 8 and
those that have denied it, 2 9 have cited Norpac for this proposition.
Norpac was, to some extent, the zenith of forfeiture in Ohio because the
court clearly allowed for relief from forfeiture only if it would leave an "unconscionably large" amount of money in the vendor's hands along with the
return of the property; note, however, that the vendee was unwilling to pay
the remaining part of the purchase price. Although after Norpac at least one
court of appeals was willing to deny a vendee the value of improvements he
made in good faith,21 0 most appellate courts have granted forfeiture only if
21 1
the vendee has no equities on his side.
Since Norpac, more courts of appeals have denied forfeiture than have
allowed it. The courts in several decisions have denied forfeiture on the theory
of waiver, usually the vendor's acceptance of late payments, or other acquiescence in untimely performance. 21 2 For example, in the 1933 case of Hegg
v. Sigle, 3 where the vendor had long accepted payments irregular both in time
and amount, the court of appeals said that the vendor had waived his right
to forfeiture. The court of appeals went on to say that the vendor would have
had a choice among four remedies if he had acted promptly:
First, to exercise the right under the special provision of the contract upon
the first default to exercise their election to forfeit the same and retain
the payments made up to that time as liquidated damages; Second, upon
a substantial default rescind the contract upon an offer to restore the consideration already received; Third, to have declared the balance of the
0

2 'd.
206Id. at 430, 140 N.E. at 481.

"'Note, Land Contracts in Ohio - The Need for Reform, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 554, 561 (1962).
'"E.g., Clukey v. Doro Realty Co., 5 Ohio Law Abs. 260 (App. Lucas Co. 1926); Economy Say. & Loan
Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (Williams Co. 1957); Miami Inv. Corp. v. Baker,
109 Ohio App. 334, 165 N.E.2d 690 (Montgomery Co. 1959).
"'E.g., Ardolino v. Baumann, 3 Ohio Law Abs. 374 (App. Lucas Co. 1925).
"'McGriff v. Hays, 29 Ohio Law Abs. 534 (App. Montgomery Co. 1939).
"See, e.g., Clukey v. Doro Realty Co.,5 Ohio Law Abs. (App. Lucas Co. 1926); Almira v. Geren, 29
Ohio Law Abs. 570 (App. Franklin Co. 1939); Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App.
243, 152 N.E.2d 125 (Williams Co. 1957); Miami Inv. Corp. v. Baker, 109 Ohio App. 334, 165 N.E.2d
690 (Montgomery Co. 1959).
'E.g., Hegg v. Sigle, 14 Ohio Law Abs. 456 (App. Mahoning Co. 1933); Cleland v. Cleland, 152 N.E.2d
914 (C.P. Meigs Co. 1958).
"1'4 Ohio Law Abs. 456, 458 (App. Mahoning Co. 1933).
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contract price due and payable and obtained a personal judgment therefore;
Fourth, they might have foreclosed their contract upon obtaining a personal
judgment.2"4
While it is humorous to note that the court of appeals in Hegg recommends forfeiture upon the first default, but rescission, a much more equitable
remedy in that the vendee at least gets his money back, only upon a substantial default, it is important to note two points. First, the court acknowledges
the forfeiture remedy but does not mention that it would be limited by the
Norpac "qualification test." Second, although other courts have rejected the
analogy of land contracts to mortgages,2' the fourth remedy suggested by the
court is foreclosure after obtaining a personal judgment, which is much like
foreclosure of a mortgage. This 1933 court of appeals, then, acknowledges
foreclosure, a remedy previously rejected, and its reference to forfeiture must
be tempered by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Norpac.
Several courts of appeals have denied forfeiture in cases where the vendee
was willing and able to pay the entire amount due,2" 6 and one court has allowed
the vendee to pay all past due installments and continue paying on the
contract.2" 7 In each of these cases the courts of appeals appear to be of the
opinion that the vendee's interest is too great to be forfeited since the vendee
had paid a great deal of the purchase price at the time forfeiture was asserted
218 the
by the vendor. In the 1963 case of Blenheim Homes, Inc. v. Matthews,
court of appeals made it clear that it thought a land conract should be treated
as a mortgage. The court of appeals termed its allowing the vendee to tender
back payments and be reinstated "redemption,

' ' 21 9

yet another mortgage law

term.
With a paucity of recent cases, Blenheim being the most recent, it appears
that Ohio's land contract case law is fairly progressive. Forfeiture appears to
220
be appropriate only upon a showing that the vendee has paid little or nothing,
has little excuse for not paying,

22 1

or is unwilling or unable to pay2 22 and that

223
the vendor has faithfully complied with the contract and consistently insisted

that the vendee comply with the contract.

224

As long as the vendee can raise

2'Id.
"'See supra note 198 and accompanying text.

1'6Ardolino v. Baumann, 3 Ohio Law Abs. 374 (App. Lucas Co. 1925); Morris v. George C. Banning,
Inc. 77 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); Dependabilt Homes, Inc. v. White, 117 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1951).
'Blenheim Homes, Inc. v. Matthews, 119 Ohio App. 44, 196 N.E.2d 612 (Franklin Co. 1963).
'"Id. at 48, 196 N.E.2d at 615.
2'9Id. at 49, 196 N.E.2d at 615.
2'See supra text accompanying notes 188-97; 203-11.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 188-97; 203-1I.
22See supra text accompanying notes 188-97; 203-11.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
"See supra text accompanying notes 199; 212-15.
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some equity on his side, especially if he is willing to tender full performance,
it appears he can avoid forfeiture. It is interesting to note, however, that the
current practitioner-oriented literature is remarkably vague and contradictory
with respect to land contract remedies. " 5 With this perspective, the Ohio land
contract statute becomes even more curious.
B. Post-1969 Residential Land Contracts

The Act was apparently intended to reform and make more equitable
Ohio's treatment of residential land contracts. One commentator has stated
that the Act was enacted by a "consumer oriented" legislature which was "passing laws to protect those who do not have enough bargaining power to protect
themselves." 2 6 The commentator further characterized the Act as seeking "to
prevent the land contract Vendor from taking undue advantage of the typical
impecunious, unadvised Vendee."" 7 Thus the Ohio Legislature appeared to
be attempting to protect low-income vendees from their vendors or at least
clarifying their respective rights upon the vendee's default. 28 Although the rights
of the parties to land contracts covered by the Act may have been clarified,
it is questionable that vendees were protected from their vendors.
In analyzing the Act, the best point of departure is the definitional section
which establishes which land contracts the Act covers. The original section
5313.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code provided: " 'Property' means real property located in this state improved by virtue of a dwelling having been erected
on the real property where the purchase price does not exceed thirty thousand
dollars." 2" As originally passed, then, the Act only affected land contracts
on what were probably even then middle-priced and below single-family homes,
with no requirement that the vendee occupy the home.23 The Legislature
changed this by deleting the $30,000 limitation in 1980, thus leaving the Act
controlling all land contracts on single-family homes,2" ' still, however, regardless
of whether they were owner-occupied.
In addition to setting forth the required contents of land contracts " and
requiring recordation, " the Act strictly regulates vendees' and vendors' remedies
22

Compare 54 O.JuR. 2d Vendor and Purchaser§§ 130-138.1 (1962 & Supp. 1982), which seems to say
obtaining forfeiture will pose no problem, with 3 WEST'S OHIO PRACTICE §§ 910-44 (1964 & Supp. 1980)
and 2 COUSE'S OHIO FORM BOOK 848 (1960 & Supp. 1982), which raise problems, and with MCDERMOTT'S
HANDBOOK OF OHIO REAL ESTATE LAW § 29.3 (1972); 3 OHIO REAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 28-111
(Supp. 1980), which do not comment at all.
2
. Smith, Land Installment Contracts(An Analysis of the 1969 Act), Ohio State Bar Association Service

Letter I, 1 (Dec. 1969).
22

1id.

2

"Id.

12'1969

Ohio Laws 424, 424-30 (effective Nov. 25, 1969) (current version at OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §

5313.01(B) (Page 1981)).

2"Smith, supra note 226, at 2.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B) (Page 1981).
...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(A) (Page 1981).
."OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(C) (Page 1981).
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upon breach by the other.1 4 The important provisions, of course, are those
establishing a vendor's remedies upon breach by the vendee.
In order to being an action for forfeiture or foreclosure on a land contract covered by the Act, a vendor must first allow thirty days to pass after
any default by the vendee.2 35 During that thirty-day period a vendee may
reinstate the contract:
A vendee in default may, prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period,
avoid the forfeiture of his interest under the contract by making all
payments currently due under the contract and by paying any fees or
charges for which he is liable under the contract. If such payments are
made within the thirty-day period, forfeiture of the interest of the vendee
shall not be enforced.2 36
This section appears to allow reinstatement, that is, "all payments currently
due under the contract" should not be interpreted as providing for operation
of an acceleration clause making the entire balance under the land contract
immediately due. If one were so to interpret it, section 5313.06, which provides for notice by the vendor and a ten-day waiting period, would be
superfluous.
Section 5313.06 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in relevant part:
Following expiration of the period of time provided in section 5313.05
of the Revised Code, forfeiture of the interst of vendee in default under
a land installment contract shall be initiated by the vendor or by his successor in interest, by serving or causing to be served on the vendee or his
successor in interest, if known to the vendor or his successor in interest,
a written notice which:
(A) Reasonably identifies the contract and describes the property
covered by it;
(B) Specifies the terms and conditions of the contract which have
not been complied with;
(C) Notifies the vendee that the contract will stand forfeited unless
the vendee performs the terms and conditions of the contract within ten
days of the completed service of notice and notifies the vendee to leave
"I
the premises. ....
Again, this appears to be a period in which the vendee may reinstate the contract. If not, the language of subsection (B), "Specifies the terms and conditions of the contract which have not been complied with," would be largely
superfluous if the terms and conditions were the accelerated entire balance due
under the land contract. Note, also, that the notification of "forfeiture" referred
.'OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 5313.04-. 10 (Page 1981).

"'1OHIo
2'Id.

REV. CODE ANN.

§

...OHio

REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.06 (Page 1981).

5313.05 (Page 1981).
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to in section 5313.06 is misleading; section 5313.07, the foreclosure section,
refers to both section 5313.05 and section 5313.06 for the procedure that must
be followed in instituting a foreclosure action."23
239
If a residential land contract has not been in effect five years of more,
'° then Section 5313.08
and less than 20%70 of the purchase price has been paid,"
controls. Section 5313.08 provides in relevant part:
If the contract has been in effect for less than five years, in addition
to any other remedies provided by law and after the expiration of the
periods prescribed by sections 5313.05 and 5313.06 of the Revised Code,
if the vendee is still in default of any payment the vendor may bring an
action for forfeiture of the vendee's rights in the land installment contract and for restitution of his property under Chapter 1923. of the Revised
24"
Code .
Chapter 1923. of the Ohio Revised Code gives Ohio courts the authority to
declare forfeiture. Section 1923.02 states in relevant part:
(A) Proceedings under Chapter 1923. of the Revised Code, may be
had:

(7) In cases arising out of Chapter 5313. of the Revised Code. In
such cases the court shall have the authority to declare a forfeiture of
the vendee's rights under a land installment contract and to grant any
other claims arising out of the contract ... .
Section 1923.02(A)(7) should be read in conjunction with section 1923.09. Section 1923.09 provides in relevant part: "If he [the county court judge] finds
the complaint true, he shall render a general judgment against the defendant
of the plaintiff [vendor], for restitution of the premises and
[vendee] in favor
24 3
suit.
of
costs
When one couples section 1923.02 with section 1923.09, one of two conclusions has to be reached: either a trial court must declare a forfeiture when
properly requested, a conclusion which results from a literal reading of the
statutes, or the statutes strongly favor declaration of forfeiture when the
statutory procedure is followed, a conclusion which allows the court to con2

.OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§

5313.07 (Page 1981).

...OH10 REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08 (Page 1981).
2
'°There is a conflict between § 5313.07 and § 5313.08. Section 5313.07 requires foreclosure if the land
contract has been in effect at least five years or 2007o or more of the purchase price has been paid, while
§ 5313.08 allows forfeiture if the land contract has been in effect less than five years. No commentator
or court has discussed this conflict, perhaps because the answer is readily apparent. First, § 5313.07 is
mandatory and § 5313.08 is permissive; the mandatory must control. Second, if § 5313.08 controlled,
the entire reference to land contracts on which 2007o or more of the purchase price has been paid is
meaningless; the legislature would not have included a meaningless reference in two simultaneously passed
code sections.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08 (Page 1981).
22

' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(A)(7) (Page 1983).

2

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.09 (Page 1983).
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sider equity. As Professors Nelson and Whitman have stated in referring
generally to forfeiture statutes: "[T] o some degree these statutes have institutionalized or formalized the forfeiture concept and, in so doing, may have tended
to discourage judicial interference in those situations where the vendor complies with the statutory forfeiture method." 2 ' That is exactly what the Ohio
statutory procedure has done.
Since the Act's passage in 1969, the Ohio Supreme Court has not decided
a statutory land contract case and only four published Ohio Courts of Appeals
cases have cited it.2" 5 Even more importantly, only one of the courts of appeals
cases has even dealt with the question of statutory forfeiture, the 1980 case
of Marvin v. Stemen. 11 6 In Marvin, the court of appeals concluded that even
after forfeiture had been granted under section 5313.08 through the procedure
in Chapter 1923, the vendor could bring another action for damages under
section 5313.10.247 Therefore, in the only case on statutory forfeiture the court
of appeals accepted rigid forfeiture and let the vendor bring a separate action
for damages, hardly a result evidencing equitable considerations by the court.
Section 5313.07 requires a vendee's interest in a residential land contract
to be foreclosed if 20% or more of the purchase price has been paid or if the
land contract has been in effect five years or more.2" 8 Section 5313.07 provides in relevant part:
If the vendee of a land installment contract has paid in accordance
with the terms of the contract for a period of five years or more from
the date of the first payment or has paid toward the purchase price a total
sum equal to or in excess to twenty percent thereof, the vendor may recover
possession of his property only by use of a proceeding for foreclosure
and judicial sale of the foreclosed property. . . In such an action, as
between the vendor and vendee, the vendor shall be entitled to proceeds
of the sale up to and including the unpaid balance due on the land
installment contract...
Chapter 5313. of the Revised Code does not prevent the vendor or
vendee of a land installment contract from commencing a quiet title action to establish the validity of his claim to the property conveyed under
a land installment contract nor from bringing an action for unpaid installments ... .
1"Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 545 (citing Note, Forfeitureand the Iowa Installment Land Contract,
46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 797 (1961)).
14 Marvin v. Stemen, 68 Ohio App. 2d 26, 426 N.E.2d 205 (Lucas Co. 1980); Stratton v. Robey, 70 Ohio
App. 2d 4, 433 N.E.2d 938 (Franklin Co. 1980); Stowers v. Baron, 65 Ohio App. 2d 283, 418 N.E.2d
404 (Lucas Co. 1979); Garl v. Mihuta, 50 Ohio App. 2d 142, 361 N.E.2d 1065 (Lorain Co. 1975).
'68 Ohio App. 2d 26, 426 N.E.2d 205 (1980).
14'Id. at 29, 426 N.E.2d at 207. Section 5313.10 (Page 1981) allows the vendor to recover damages equal
to the difference between the amount paid by the vendee and the fair rental value, plus an amount for
deterioration or destruction caused by the vendee's use of the premises. See infra text accompanying notes
255-56.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Page 1981).

"9d.
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Although section 5313.07 prohibits forfeiture, the vendor still has other
options. 25 ° First, the vendor may bring an action to interpret the contract, if
there is any dispute over the interests created and retained under the contract,
by bringing a quiet title action.2"' Second, the vendor may bring an action for
the past due installments.252 It appears to be possible also to use the statute's
language as the basis for a suit for specific performance by the vendee if the
land contract contains an acceleration clause and the vendor has declared the
contract to be accelerated. 53
Third, the vendor would be able to seek damages, during or after 5 a
foreclosure action, or, for that matter, a forfeiture action, under section 5313.10,
which states:
The election of the vendor to terminate the land installment contract
by an action under section 5313.07 or 5313.08 of the Revised Code is an
exclusive remedy which bars further action on the contract unless the
vendee has paid an amount less than the fair rental value plus deterioration or destruction of the property occasioned by the vendee's use. In such
a case the vendor may recover the difference between the amount paid
by the vendee on the contract and the fair rental value of the property
plus an amount for the deterioration or destruction of the property occasioned by the vendee's use.25
Although such an action for damages is dissimilar to a deficiency action as
part of foreclosure of a mortgage,2 56 it does give the vendor the opportunity
to collect some damages. Further, it gives the vendor some leverage in negotiating
with the vendee before filing a foreclosure action since it gives the vendor some
claim to damages beyond the forfeiture or foreclosure, although the language
of sections 5313.07 and 5313.08, coupled with the language of section 5313.10,
prohibits a true deficiency action or any action following forfeiture other than
an action pursuant to section 5313.10. The probable reason for prohibiting
any other actions is that since Ohio limits deficiencies upon mortgage foreclosure
of residences, 5 this provision in the Act merely serves as an incentive for the
vendor at a foreclosure sales to bid until the bidding level reaches the amount
owed. Either he will get his money if someone else bids the amount owed, or
if he bids the amount owed he will get the house back. He has no reason to
let another buy the house for less than the amount owed; if he does he will
1°"[TIhe vendor may recover possession of his property only by use of a proceeding for foreclosure..
Id. (emphasis added)
261
Id.
2521d.
2"This would be consistent with non-statutory Ohio land contract law.
"See supra note 5.

§ 5313.10 (Page 1981).
2"Deficiency judgments upon foreclosure of owner-occupiers of one- or two-family dwellings are restricted
in Ohio. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.08 (Page 1981).
."OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

2571d.
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not get the house and will only get part of the money owed by the vendee.
Section 5313.10 may be an incentive for forfeiture, if available, however. It
severely limits a vendor's recovery beyond foreclosure. Thus, getting the house
through forfeiture may be the best remedy.
As has already been indicated, however, for those residential land contracts for which foreclosure is not required an action for forfeiture is not required but is allowed.2" 8 Therefore, it appears that a vendor can also choose
among the other remedies traditionally allowed by Ohio courts, rescission, suit
for money, and foreclosure,"' since section 5313.08 forfeiture is permissible
and no statutory direction is given as to other available remedies. Section 5313.10
if section 5313.07 foreclosure or section 5313.08
only limits a vendor's remedies
260
forfeiture is pursued.
The more troubling problem is to decide what will happen when the vendor does choose forfeiture as his remedy. If we accept the view that Ohio courts
will interpret section 5313.08, when coupled with Chapter 1923, either to require granting forfeiture when requested or to raise a very strong presumption
in favor of the forfeiture remedy, 6' then it is likely that a court will grant
forfeiture as a matter of law rather than exercise its equitable jurisdiction and
consider factors normally used by Ohio courts in non-statutory forfeiture cases
such as waiver, the amount paid by the vendee, and the willingness of the vendee
to tender the total balance due under the land contract.2 62 Forfeiture is, then,
truly a cold, pro-vendor remedy which may be used when there has been default
even though the equities favor allowing the vendee to reinstate or tender full
payment. Unlike defaults on land contracts not covered by the Act, where Ohio
courts have clearly been inclined to give vendees equitable relief, the vendee
subject to statutory forfeiture may find himself faced with a judge who either
feels constrained by the statute from granting equitable relief or takes comfort
in the simplicity of the statute and ignores the possibility of equitable action.
This is even more troubling when considered in light of the study on Ohio
land contracts previously discussed.2 63 As the study demonstrated, there are
many land contracts for substantial amounts and short terms which fall outside of the foreclosure requirement of section 5313.07; the danger of forfeiture
is neither remote nor limited to low-income transactions. There is a clear need,
therefore, either to amend the Act and make it reflect current realities or for
2

s'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08 (Page 1981) states that "the vendor may bring an action for
forfeiture . . ." and that "the court may also grant any other claim arising out of the contract." See
also supra note 240 for a discussion of the effects of the permissive rather than mandatory language of
§ 5313.08.
."See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
014OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (Page 1981).

See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-225.
'See supra text accompanying notes 77-96.

6
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judges to actively use their inherent equitable powers when dealing with sections 5313.08 forfeitures.
V. PROPOSAL

A. Considerations
The current rationale for land contracts is quite straightforward. 1) Sellers
need to enter into land contracts and will enter into land contracts only if they
can obtain forfeiture upon default by the buyer; and 2) Forfeiture is justifiable
because of the increased risk inherent in a land contract as most land contract
vendees are low-income persons or "high-risk" persons who cannot, for various
reasons, obtain commercial financing. Another rationale, now thoroughly
discredited, is that forfeiture is merely recognizing that time is of the essence
in land contracts and then allowing the remedy of restitution of the premises
to the vendor and treating the vendee's payments to the vendor as liquidated
damages. Interestingly, however, "time is of the essence" did drop up in a
few twentieth century Ohio land contract cases as the basis for deciding whether
to allow forfeiture. 264 To determine how defaults by land contract vendees should
be treated, it is not necessary to deal with the "time is of the essence" rationale
but it is necessary to know whether the current rationale has merit.
The first part of the rationale, that sellers need to enter into land contracts and will enter into land contracts only if they can obtain forfeiture, is
fallacious for several reasons. First, as has been already pointed out, a seller,
with rare exception, needs to sell property.26 5 The "need" may arise because
the seller no longer needs the property, cannot afford to keep the property,
desires to make a profit, desires to avoid a loss, or for many other reasons.
Suffice it to say, regardless of whether the sale is by absolute deed, with or
without a mortgage being taken back by the seller, or by land contract, in most
situations a seller will sell, even though some sales may be on less economically
advantageous terms than others.
Second, even if we want to encourage sellers by allowing buyers to buy
without resort to commercial moneylenders or by giving the buyer a "good
deal" on the terms of a loan, land contracts still are not necessary. A wraparound mortgage performs exactly the same function as a land contract, with
the obvious differences being that in the case of the wrap-around mortgage,
the buyer gets a deed and the seller's only recourse upon default is traditional
foreclosure. 266 All the economic desires of the seller and buyer are fulfilled;
the only "loss" to the seller is the forfeiture remedy. 26'

"'See, e.g., Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackne, 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923).
See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.

2

...
See supra note 43.
'Since Ohio requires land contracts covered by Chapter 5313 to be recorded, OHIo REV.
5313.02 (Page 1981), the effect is identical except for the forfeiture remedy.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983

CODE ANN.

§

35

Akron AKRON
Law Review,
Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 3, Art. 2
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

Third, it makes no difference whether one reasons that forfeiture is allowed
so that sellers will use land contracts, or that sellers use land contracts because
they can get forfeiture. The basis for deciding whether to allow forfeiture must
be free from the idea that land contracts have a function, economic or otherwise; it must be founded on whether forfeiture has a function that outweighs
its negatives.
One can also rebut the second posited rationale that forfeiture is desirable
because of the increased risk inherent in land contracts because of the nature
of the vendee. In fact there may be no increased risk. The low down payment
made by a low-income person may be as great or greater in relation to his income and net worth as a 20% or greater down payment made by a wealthier
person is to his income and net worth. A low-income person's interest to him
is as worth protecting as is a wealthier person's interest to him. This argument
is quite strong as long as the vendee has some interest in the property; either
he has made not insubstantial payments or the property has appreciated during the term of his ownership. The fact that the interest of the vendee is trivial
to the vendor begs the question because it almost always will be. For example,
to a commercial mortgagee the typical mortgagor's interest is trivial. If we take
the commercial mortgagee's position in deciding what remedies he might have
upon the mortgagor's default, a strong case could be made for strict foreclosure
in almost all defaults on mortgages on single-family homes.
In addition, the vendor who must foreclose is not hurt by having to
foreclose. He has contracted to sell his property for a sum certain and has received some amount toward that sum.2" 8 Upon the vendee's default having to
foreclose merely means either that the vendor will get his money, if a third
party bids at least what is owed to the vendor, or that he will be forced to
credit-bid the amount of his lien, thereby buying the property for the amount
owed to him and retaining all payments made by the vendee. The end result
is the same to the vendor, but there is a great benefit to the vendee in having
the value of the property "tested" at a public sale; if it is sold for more than
is owed to the vendor, the vendor gets his money and the vendee gets the remainder. Especially since Ohio's foreclosure law does not allow post-foreclosure
sale redemption,269 foreclosure is no more fraught with risk than the forfeiture
procedure. The only significant loss to the vendor who is forced to foreclose
is time. It is somewhat quicker to obtain forfeiture,27 ° if it is granted, than
to bring a suit for foreclosure, have the property appraised, and cause it to
be sold.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, to emphasize the low income trans"'He has received the down payment, if any, and any payments made before default.
.'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.17 (Page 1981) (appraisal); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.20 (Page 1981)
(sale).
"'Forfeiture requires bringing an action and obtaining a judgment pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5313.08 (Page 1981).
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action is to risk ignoring the fact that most Ohio land contract transactions
are not low income.2 7 ' It is fair to assume that few, if any, vendees expect to
default. Furthermore, few would argue that the $6,440 down payment which
the typical Montgomery County land contract vendee would have made in 1981
on his $46,000 house is trivial, and certainly the much larger interests of most
of the vendees who were above the median are not trivial, yet those interests
would be subject to forfeiture even if the vendee's default were due to causes
beyond his control.2" The sword of forfeiture is clearly too mightly in such
a case.
This is not to say, however, that forfeiture has no place and must be
abolished. Equally obvious as the unfairness of forfeiture in the typical 1981
Montgomery County land contract is the absurdity of forcing a vendor to bring
a foreclosure action and have the property appraised and sold when the vendee
has no equity in the property.273 Forfeiture is an appropriate remedy when the
defaulting vendee has no interest in the property because the vendor is able
to quickly regain the property; in effect the vendor will obtain this possession
of the property with either forfeiture or foreclosure. The response, of course,
can be that it is impossible to predict when the vendee will have no equity in
the property and that the burden is more fairly placed on the vendor in requiring foreclosure. This is not to say that foreclosure is the perfect remedy, because
it may be possible to put the burden on the vendor, allow forfeiture, and be
fair to the vendee.
Lack of fairness is the problem with the current Ohio statute. As suggested
before, perhaps the proponents of the Act thought it was fair when it was
originally passed and was limited to properties sold for less than $30,000; the
argument would have been that equities below $6,000 were not worth
protecting. 7 " Even accepting that view, the $30,000 limitation was unfair because
it did not take into consideration increases in the value of the property by inflation and improvement. By removing the $30,000 limitation in 1980, the Ohio
Legislature has left the Act an anomaly, a reform statute which does not reform
but makes matters worse by serving as a basis for forfeiture without equitable
consideration. 2" The problems occur in applying the Act as written. Therefore,
the solution can either be remedial action by the Legislature or equitable action
by the courts.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
"'in the "typical" case, the contract would not have been in existence for five years and the $6,440 down
payment is 140o of the $46,000 purchase price. Therefore, under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.07-.08
(Page 1981), forfeiture is permissible. For the data supporting the 14% and the $46,000 figures, see supra
text acompanying notes 78-81 and 85-87.
"'The vendee has no equity in the property when the property is worth an amount equal to or less than
the amount owed under the land contract.
1"$6,000 is 20% of $30,000, the lowest limit for required foreclosure under OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
5313.07.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 226-28.
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B. Legislative Proposals
There are several options available to the Ohio legislature in dealing with
the Act. First, most obviously, it could do nothing, happy either to allow the
statute to operate as written or to sit back and hope that Ohio's trial and appellate courts will apply the statute with a strong dose of equity. Neither of
these options should be particularly palatable to the Legislature.
The legislature should reject application of the statute as written. In 1969
the legislature intended to reform land contract law in Ohio and make it more
certain. 7 6 The 1980 amendment which removed the S3 0 ,000 limitation was yet
another reform bill, designed to extend the benefits of the Act, and especially
the foreclosure requirement of section 5313.07, to all Ohio residential land contract vendees. Both bills did reform land contract law as it applied to some
land contracts. Unfortunately the bills also caused land contract law as to other
2 77
of strict forfeiture.
land contracts to worsen with the apparent reinstatement
If the interests for which forfeiture was reinstated were trivial, the "reform"
might be palatable; as a consequence, however, even significant interests are
now subject to forfeiture.278
The legislature should also reject sitting back and allowing the courts time
to introduce equity into the statutory scheme. Appellate court-made law is inherently uneven; different courts will decide similar cases differently and rarely
does a case present enough issues to allow a court to interpret and interrelate
an entire statutory scheme. In addition, many cases will be decided at the trial
level without benefit of appellate court interpretation; certainly the paucity of
cases since 1969 deciding substantive issues under the Act indicates either that
few cases have been appealed and resulted in published opinions or that the
appellate courts do not consider the issues significant enough to warrant
published opinions. 79 Perhaps the best reason for rejecting reliance on equitable
judicial action is the significant mistrust most legislators have for appellate court
judges, especially ones who "make law."
If the legislature chooses to act, the simplest reform would be to abolish
forfeiture.28 ° This is the method that the Oklahoma legislature chose and which
8
This
the Kentucky Supreme Court has chosen for Ohio's southern neighbor.
reference
the
deleting
5313.08
section
repealing
by
change could be made simply
to section 5313.08 in section 5313.10, changing all references to "forfeiture"
"'See supra text accompanying notes 226-28.
2"'See supra text accompanying notes 248-62.
1'See supra text accompanying notes 78-87.
17'See Black, Hide and Seek Precedent:Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1981); Black,
Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1982).
"'Obviously, another simple act would be to repeal Chapter 5313 and leave land contracts to case law.
It is unlikely, however, for the reasons stated concerning judicial interpretation, that once the legislature
has spoken it will consciously allow the subject matter to revert back to the appellate courts.
" See supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
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in sections 5313.05 and 5313.06 to "foreclosure," and amending section 5313.07
to cover all residential land contracts.2" 2 With this new structure, foreclosure
would be the only way that a vendor could regain possession of the property,
and land contracts would defacto have been converted to mortgages. 2 83 This
would solve the problem of the inequitable distinction currently drawn in sections 5313.07 and 5313.08. It would be fair to vendees, but it would not be
2 '
fair to vendors in cases in which the vendee has little or no equity. "
If the legislature decides to keep the forfeiture-foreclosure split, the question will be how to divide on a basis more equitable than now exists those cases
where forfeiture would be allowed from those where foreclosure would be required. The current criteria for dividing contracts required to be foreclosed
from those which may be forfeited do not accomplish the purpose of protecting
valuable interests. The author therefore proposes four major revisions to the
Act: 1) The exclusion, as a factor, of the length of time the contract has been
in effect. 2) The reduction of the percentage to 5% for requiring foreclosure
with that percentage being based on "true equity" rather than on the amount
paid on the purchase price. 3) The requirement for an appraisal to establish
the current property value and the vendee's "true equity." 4) The inclusion
of an express authorization to trial judges to order foreclosure in any case where
equity dictates, even though the statute technically allows forfeiture.
First, any qualifying period for requiring foreclosure should be abolished.
The five-year limitation in section 5313.07 is nonsensical; a contract could be
in effect for a five year period in which the value of the property, and hence
the vendee's equity, dropped or it could be in effect for a two year period where
values increased by 10% or more per year. 25 The length of time the land contract has been in effect may affect the sentimental interest of the vendee in
his house. However, the interests being protected are inherently economic; time
does not necessarily strengthen economic interests.
The second revision, lowering the percentage for required foreclosure to
a 507 "true equity, 2 8 s6 also should make the statute much more fair. The cur2

.Section 5313.07 would then read:
The vendor of a land installment contract may recover possession of his property only by use
of a proceeding for foreclosure and judicial sale of the foreclosed property as provided in section
2323.07 of the Revised Code, and only after expiration of the periods of time prescribed by sections
5313.05 and 5313.06 of the Revised Code. In such an action, the vendor shall be entitled to the
proceeds of the sale up to and including the unpaid balance due on the land installment contract.
The second and third paragraphs of current § 5313.07 should then be made the new § 5313.08.
" 3The only differences, of course, are that the vendor would still have legal title and the vendor would
be unable to obtain a deficiency judgment, as § 5313.10 would still limit a vendor to damages only if
the vendee had paid on the contract less than the fair rental value of the property during the vendee's
possession plus any deterioration or destruction of the property caused by the vendee. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5313.10 (Page 1981).
2
s'See supra text accompanying note 273.
2
'Real estate prices have fallen during many periods in the twentieth century and certainly the late 1970's
showed the possibility for rapid increases.
6
"s See infra text accompanying notes 290-91.
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rent 20% limitation is just too high. Even putting aside the argument that
whether an interest is worth protecting should be determined in relation to the
vendee and not the vendor of the value of the land,"8 7 20% of the median 1981
land contract sales price, $46,000, is still $9,200. A $9,000 down payment is
too much to allow to be forfeited, particularly in relation to what that $9,000
means to the typical buyer of a $46,000 house.
The problem is that any percentage may be unfair in some situations. Consider the highest sales price uncovered by the study, $500,000. Even 1% would
be $5,000, an interest one may feel uncomfortable in allowing to be forfeited.
This argument can be rebutted, of course, because even if foreclosure is required, that 1% interest will most likely not be protected; most foreclosure
sales are made to mortgagees who bid no more than what they are owed." 8
Other percentages could be justified, but 5% seems to treat both sides
fairly by letting vendors declare forfeiture in cases where the cost of foreclosure
and sale and the inevitable lower price a foreclosure sale brings would surely
exceed the vendee's equity. There is a fairly large number of cases where the
vendee's equity is less than 5%; for example, 14% of the land contracts studied
had down payments, or vendees' initial equities, of 4% or less of the purchase
price. 89 The vendee would be free from forfeiture unless his true equity was
less than 5 %; in the land contracts studied, for example, the median land contract vendee would only need to make a down payment, or have a true equity,
of $2,700, 5% of $46,000.
The third revision, requiring an appraisal to establish the current value
of the property and the vendee's "true equity," involves two changes. The
vendee's interest is not measured by the amount he has paid on the land contract but by his "true equity," the amount he has paid adjusted by any change
in the value of the property caused by improvements or appreciation or depreciation in value. Second, the relevant property value is not the purchase price but
current market value. Determining this value will require an appraisal of the
property upon the vendor's institution of a forfeiture action. While requiring
an appraisal may seem cumbersome, this is exactly what is currently required
in Ohio foreclosure actions.2 90 Once an appraisal is completed, it is simple to
determine the vendee's percentage interest2 9 ' and whether the vendor's action
must be for foreclosure or may be for forfeiture. Two other things are also
accomplished by requiring an appraisal to establish current value. If the vendee's
equity is 5% or more, and foreclosure is required, the required foreclosure
appraisal has already been done, while if the vendee's equity is less than 5%
"'See supra text accompanying note 273.
"'Nelson & Whitman, supra note 22, at 452.
"'9See Appendix A.
'OHIo

REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.17 (Page 1981).

" This interest is calculated by subtracting the amount owed from the appraised value and dividing the
result by the appraised price: (Appraised price - Current balance) - Appraised Price = Equity.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss3/2

40

Winter, 19831

Durham:
Residential Land Contracts
RESIDENTIAL LAND CONTRACTS

the court now has an independent basis for deciding on any equitable relief
from statutorily allowed forfeiture.
Finally, there should also be explicit authorization to a trial court to grant
equitable relief in cases where forfeiture is allowed; without it the proposed
5% limitation, or any percentage limitation, is potentially as inequitable as the
current 2007o. If 50/o is applied to the highest purchase price in the study, $500,000
it results in a minimum protectable initial equity of $25,000, an amount which,
in most cases, it would be inequitable to allow to be forfeited. A trial judge
should be able to so find and force the vendor to foreclose rather than seek
forfeiture.
If the division between forfeiture and foreclosure is maintained, two further
problems should be addressed. First, it should be made clear that a vendor
may choose foreclosure even if forfeiture is permissible in his case. Although
this is arguably the case under section 5313.08,292 it should be made explicit;
there is no reason not to allow a vendor to opt for foreclosure instead of
forfeiture.
Second, the vendee should be given the express right to redeem. Once it
is decided to allow forfeiture in some case, equity dictates that if the vendee
is willing to pay the entire amount due, along with interest and the vendor's
costs, he should be allowed to do so. In order to parallel Ohio's mortgage law,
which allows redemption by a mortgagor in default up to judicial confirmation of a foreclosure sale,29 3 the most practical time to cut off the right of
redemption for a vendee in default would be the date of the entry of a final
judgment of forfeiture. The vendee would then have the absolute right to give
the vendor what the vendor has a right to expect, his money.""
The changes to Chapter 5313 necessary to carry out the author's proposal
are fairly straightforward. The first sentence in section 5313.07 would be revised
to read:
If the vendee of a land installment contract has an equity of five percent
or more in the property, the vendor may recover possession of his property only by use of a proceeding for foreclosure and judicial sale of the
foreclosed property as provided in section 2323.07 of the Revised Code.
Section 5313.08 would be revised by changing the opening phrase to state "If
the contract is not required to be foreclosed under section 5313.07 of the Revised
Code. . . ." The section would be revised further by adding the following
sentences at the end:
The vendor may choose to bring a foreclosure action pursuant to section
"2See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
.'Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.33 (Page 1981).
9"'This continues the analogy of land contracts to mortgages which is appropriate since a land contract
is in effect a mortgage with forfeiture as a remedy.
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5313.07. If the vendor chooses to bring a forfeiture action, the court may
nonetheless determine that forfeiture would be an inequitable penalty as
applied to the vendee and order foreclosure of the contract pursuant to
Section 5313.07 of the Revised Code. Where forfeiture is ordered, the
vendee shall have the right to redeem the property, up to the date of the
entry of final judgment of forfeiture, for the amount due under the installment land contract plus the vendor's costs of suit.
Finally, subsection (F) should be added to section 5313.01 to provide the definition of "equity": "(F) 'Equity' means the difference between the value of the
property, as determined by appraisal pursuant to section 2329.17 of the Revised
Code, and the amount owed by the vendee to the vendor on the installment
land contract."
Although 5% is obviously an arbitrary number, the important parts of
the proposal can be carried out regardless of what percentage is chosen. First,
any evaluation of the vendee's interest must be based on current value and
independent appraisal is the only even near accurate method of determining
it. Second, the court must have the ability to deny forfeiture and require
foreclosure in cases where the court determines that forfeiture is not equitable.
Finally, the vendee must be able to redeem up to the entry of a final judgment. The proposed procedure does all of that and still gives the vendor who
seeks a forfeiture judgment, particularly if the vendee defaults in the legal action,
a fairly efficient remedy; the only added burden is appraisal, an existing requirement in every Ohio foreclosure.
The last consideration for the Legislature in reforming the Act is whether
to extend its coverage to all land contracts. The clear national trend is towards
the mortgagization of land contract law.295 While protecting owners of dwellings is admirable is it not also admirable to protect individuals owning triplexes
and living in one unit and owners of small businesses who buy their stores on
land contract? Perhaps the answer is that Ohio's fairly progressive judicially
created land contract law will protect them.2 96 If that were a sufficient answer,
however, the Act would be unnecessary. The answer should be that all land
contract vendees deserve the small protection of an appraisal and potentially
required foreclosure. This could be easily provided by revising section 5313.01(B)
to read: "(B) 'Property' means real property in this state." With that additional change, Ohio land contract law would become one of the fairest in the
country.
C. Judicial Proposal
Simply put, the judicial proposal is encouragement for the courts to refuse
to relinquish their equitable powers in the face of the Act. In fact, the courts
"'See supra text accompanying notes 112-83.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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should do so whether or not the Legislature chooses to amend the Act. Three
specific suggestions are made.
First, a trial court faced with an action for forfeiture under section 5313.08
should never grant forfeiture without some evidence of the fairness of granting
forfeiture. Such evidence could include an independent appraisal, the vendor's
or his expert's appraisal, or the vendee's or his expert's appraisal. Certainly
if the vendee defaults on the forfeiture action, the court should feel duty-bound
at the time the request for default is presented to it to determine in some manner
the nature of the vendee's interest, whether by the vendor's testimony or the
testimony of a third party.2" 7 If the court is unconvinced that forfeiture is appropriate, it should refuse to grant it and should require the vendor to resort to
other remedies, such as damages, rescission, or foreclosure, as may be provided by statute.298
Although it is arguable that a properly requested forfeiture must be
granted,29 9 a court should look to the permissive language of section 5313.08
that "[t]he vendor may bring an action for forfeiture of the vendee's
rights .... "30 To argue that a court is required to grant forfeiture by the terms
of section 5313.08 as implemented by section 1923.02 and section 1923.091
is to ignore the inherent equity powers of Ohio trial courts. The presence of
those powers mandates that a court not take inequitable action in carrying out
its functions.
Second, on carrying out its role in forfeiture cases a court should always
30 2 If
feel free to find waiver by the vendor in order to avoid a harsh result.
the vendor has allowed the vendee to make late payments or skip payments
completely, a court should hold that the vendor has waived his opportunity
for forfeiture. In essence, to obtain forfeiture a vendor must have complied
with all statutes and the contract and have insisted that the vendee do the same.
Third, and perhaps most important, a court should allow a vendee to
redeem up to the entry of final judgment. There is no reason to deny a vendee
this right. Even if a vendee has intentionally breached the contract the vendor
has no right to expect anything more than that for which he has contracted,
full payment under the contract. The vendee should, of course, be required
to pay, in addition to the principal balance due, interest and all the vendor's
costs in attempting collection on the land contract. Like California, 03 Ohio
2

"Ohio Rules allow a court to make such a finding when a demand for for default judgment has been

made. OHIO R. Civ. P. 55(A).
2

See supra text accompanying notes 250-55; 258-59.

...
See supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
3

.OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08 (Page 1981) (emphasis added).

" See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
"'Just as courts do in non-statutory forfeiture cases. See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
"'See MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971) and text accompanying
notes 143-50.
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should be comfortable in allowing the parties the true benefit of their bargain
and give true meaning to what has become a tired cliche, "equity abhors a
forfeiture."
VI. CONCLUSION

Ohio's current statutory scheme controlling defaults on residential land
contracts is a step in the right direction in that it requires foreclosure of many
contracts involving a vendee's significant interests which would be protected
from forfeiture. The clear national trend is to require foreclosure or other
methods of protecting a vendee's valid interests.
The need for change is great because under current economic conditions
valid interests lack protection and may need protection in the near future. Unless
there is a substantial change in interest rates and the economy in general, many
vendees may find themselves unable either to make their monthly payments
or refinance their three or five year land contracts at the end of the contracts'
terms. The results may be disastrous.
The Ohio legislature has the opportunity to enact a few simple amendments with far-reaching implications to make the statutory scheme a truly meaningful reform. The current basis for requiring foreclosure should be changed
to requiring foreclosure if the vendee has a small true equity in the property.
The equity should be measured at the time of suit. In addition, the legislature
should give trial courts the explicit right to deny forfeiture in appropriate cases
which fall within the statutory parameters allowing forfeiture. Finally, the
legislature should give the vendee the explicit right to redeem up to the entry
of a final judgment of forfeiture if forfeiture is granted.
If the legislature fails to act, the courts should use their inherent equitable
powers to lessen the harshness of the statutory scheme. Trial courts should
evaluate the equities in each request for forfeiture and deny forfeiture whenever
it would be more equitable to force the vendor to choose another remedy such
as foreclosure, rescission or damages. In addition, since the vendor is requesting
strict performance of contract terms, trial courts should require that the vendor have insisted on strict performance by the vendee; if not, the vendor should
be held to have waived his opportunity for forfeiture. If forfeiture is granted,
equity dictates that a willing vendee should be allowed to redeem.
If the legislature and the courts treat land contracts more equitably, as
recommended, Ohio's land contract law will clearly be one of the most progressive in the country. It will protect the valid interests of vendees while giving vendors the opportunity for forfeiture when the vendor lacks a valid interest. That, of course, should be the goal of all states.
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APPENDIX A
LAND CONTRACTS STUDIED

File
Number

Term -

In Years

Purchase
Price

Amount
Financed

$106,000
60,900
60,233.54
260,000
43,900
30,000
33,500
85,000
42,500
36,000

$ 90,000
50,700
10,233.54
230,000
41,900
24,000
30,000
65,000
34,500
30,000

11%
11%
7%
9%
11%
12%
10%
10.5%
11.5%
11.5%

57,000
53,000
21,000
71,900
12,000
22,000
115,000
80,000
48,000
69,860.19
46,900
58,000
12,000
35,000
320,000
33,000

45,000
50,000
15,000
64,900
11,000
22,000
100,000
60,000
38,000
52,860.19
40,900
50,000
9,000
35,000
243,000
30,000

9.5%
12%
13%
11.75%
6%
9%
10.75%
13.5%
10.75%
9.75%
10.5%
12%
11%
10%
11.5%
10.5%

Interest
Rate

January
2
6
19
24
32
42
56
65
72
80

AO
B08
D04
BO
A03
D07
C05
C07
A01
A12

February
82 B01
88 A01
93 C06
100 A02
109 B06
111 Bo
116 B03
124 A01
127 A05
131 AO1
136 E07
144 A09
146 C06
149 C06
152 E01
156 A09
March
158
160
163
168
172

E01
C04
B07
C03
D05

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983

85,000
70,500
47,500
36,500
11,500

73,000
50,500
34,500
36,000
10,500

11%
11%
10.5%
7%
13%
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APPENDIX A (continued)
File
Number

Term In Years

Purchase
Price

Amount
Financed

Interest
Rate

3
29
2
0
3
1
3
5
2
5
0
3
5

45,000
70,000
64,000
9,000
13,000
17,000
75,400
38,000
78,500
25,000
150,000
39,000
50,000

35,000
60,000
44,000
8,000
10,000
14,000
57,900
31,500
63,500
23,500
120,000
35,000
43,000

0
11%
9.5%/o
100%o
4.66707o
1407o
13.50o
10070
10.5076
10%0
120%0
10.5076
110o

3
71
5
15
3
3
5
5
5
3
0
1
5
5

15,000
495,000
25,900
500,000
43,000
32,000
75,000
39,000
39,500
38,900
25,000
49,688
70,000
40,000

13,000
380,000
23,400
361,000
35,000
28,800
65,500
34,000
34,000
32,900
22,500
29,688
28,000
35,000

100o
110%0
10.75%
9%
100o
120o
10%
9.750o
100o
100o
120o
-010.750o
110

84,000
5
361 C03
12,000
6
366 CIO
65,500
5
373 C04
50,500
0
375 D03
11,900
0
381 D06
68,500
0
386 COI
46,500
'/2
390 D09
34,900
B12
395
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss3/2

77,000
11,500
50,000
50,500
11,700
57,100

10.5%
1000
10.250o
13%
100%0
10.250o

38,130

10%0

26,175

1000

177 B08
183 E06
188 A09
193 B03
201 C12
206 B03
212 B06
227 E02
232 C12
234 E09
237 C02
241 A09
249 D08
April
253 E05
256 C07
263 E03
270 C09
278 A12
285 D02
293 C08
298 BIO
304 B08
312 C09
320 A07
330 E03
341 A05
350 B09
May
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APPENDIX A (continued)
File
Number
400
407
412
421
428
430
434
439

D05
ClI
A04
AO1
A08
D12
D07
B03

Term In Years
3
0
0
4
2

0
5
0

Amount
Financed

Interest
Rate

65,000
19,999.61
45,000
83,500
30,900
48,000
78,500
29,900

55,000
19,999.61
30,000
65,500
25,338
34,832.17
63,500
28,000

11%
9.5%
8%
11%
10%
9.75%o
10%
11%
11%

49,000

45,000

0

9,000

8,000

V2

0
2
5
2

63,900
21,000
48,900
55,000
42,900

49,600
20,000
41,000
49,500
38,700

14%
11%
9%0
10%
12%

5'/2

62,500

56,500

12%

74,727.71
6,000
95,000
22,500
61,000
65,000
110,000
13,500
31,700

12%
-010%
9%
12%
12%
12%
10%
10%

442 E04

452 C02

Purchase
Price

10%

June
462
466
472
476
483

C12
E02
D02
B11
B06

488 A01

74,751.66
6,000
100,000
37,500
76,000
80,000
140,000
15,500
32,000

495 D07
502 Dl1
504 A07
513 A01
519 C04
523 A01
529 D02
532 Bh
536 B07

1
5
11
3
0
3
30
0
5

539 D06

1

125,000

93,750

10.75%

D03
A01
D02
D12

2
25
5
5

15,000
56,900
92,500
78,900

15,000
36,900
67,500
71,900

12%
8.75%
10.5%
9.5%

B07
B08
B08
E09
A02

5
3
0
5
5

38,500
37,500
23,000
137,500
70,000

14,500
32,500
22,000
120,000
58,000

12.5%
13%
9%
10%
12.5%

545
557
562
570
July
579
583
591
595
602
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APPENDIX A (continued)
File
Number
604
609
613
618
622
627
631
635
640
646
651
657
660
662
666
673
677

A01
A10
AO1
DlI
C03
A07
B12
D12
B01
E04
D06
B03
AO
E05
D1I
D04
E07

Term -

In Years
0
3
23
0
5
7
12
2
25
3
0
2
2
0
2
42

3

Purchase
Price
90,000
65,000
49,900
40,000
39,900
14,000
165,000
54,500
9,000
62,000
3,000
44,900
34,000
3,500
28,000
64,230
35,000

Amount
Financed
72,000
57,500
28,600
28,414
34,900
14,000
115,000
46,500
8,000
52,000
2,500
35,900
27,000
3,300
28,000
49,430
30,500

Interest
Rate
12%
12%
8.25%
9.75%
11%
12%
9%
12%
12%
11%
3%
14%
12.5%
12%
-011.4%
11%

August
680 D02
684 D02
689 E05
694 COI
700 D08
706 C11
711 C06
716 D06
723 BI1
726 D10
734 D06
739 C08
743 Bll
747 A10
755 DIO
762 A05
765 A08
768 E08
771 D04
775 Bll

2
0
20
24
4
3
10
1
5
7
0
3
1
10
20
30
30
4
0
2

64,900
5,000
31,000
44,573.99
94,000
16,500
60,500
35,000
115,000
90,000
27,453.53
71,500
125,000
not given
35,000
60,000
61,000
65,500
25,000
82,500
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51,000
4,000
30,000
29,165.13
75,200
13,500
40,500
28,000
70,000
70,000
20,203.53
61,500
60,000
not given
33,950
42,000
40,000
55,500
23,500
69,500

12%
-013%
8.75%
13%
-012%
10%
12%
9.5%
11.5%
10.5%
16%
not given
11%
12%
12%
10%
12%
12%
48
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APPENDIX A (continued)
File
Number

Term In Years

Purchase
Price

Amount
Financed

Interest
Rate

September
778 A04
781 A06
784 D1O
788 C07
794 A06
800 B05
808 D04
814 A04
818 D02
824 AOl
827 E08
832 D08
838 D05
843 AOl
848 D03
852 BIO
859 B12
867 E03

4
5
3
0
1
5
5
4
2
2
5
0
5
2
8
3
27
4

66,000
149,000
25,900
150,000
55,000
40,000
32,000
12,000
57,900
32,000
72,000
18,000
12,900
86,000
77,000
37,000
54,000
25,500

58,000
134,000
23,400
125,000
45,000
35,100
32,000
10,800
52,110
30,000
61,000
17,000
10,900
77,400
42,000
32,000
43,561.61
23,000

12%
-010%
12%
11%
12.5%
8.2319%
10%
10%
13%
12%
1407o
11%
10%
12%
11%
10.5%
9%

55,400
73,000
20,000
6,000
38,300
63,000
24,000
8,500
34,000
15,500
53,300
20,000
25,000
11,400
21,000
70,000

807o
11.5%
12%
10%
9.5076
11%
16%
10%
12%
13.50%6
10%
12%
10%
12%
12%
12%

October
874
878
886
891
896
903
909
914
922
925
931
936
939
943
948
957

BO
B09
A08
C08
D03
D1O
C02
D04
B1
CIO
D05
D1O
DOI
C03
A07
C12

31
3
2
5
4
3
21
10
5
2
3
12
0
5
5
2
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85,900
22,000
6,500
41,500
71,000
25,000
10,500
35,000
17,000
57,000
43,000
35,000
12,900
24,500
85,000
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APPENDIX A (continued)
File
Number

Term In Years

Purchase
Price

Amount
Financed

Interest
Rate

November
965
970
974
978
984
988
996
1000
1006
1011
1014
1018
1025
1029
1032
1041

A04
C04
COI
C08
C08
D04
A05
C08
D09
E03
C02
E04
A08
C03
E09
E08

30
1
3
3
0
10
30
3
1
30
1
5
2
3
0
0

42,000
63,000
61,000
42,000
47,200
68,900
67,000
67,000
57,700
40,000
39,000
71,000
100,000
49,000
13,000
9,500

33,600
63,000
52,400
42,000
46,200
48,900
57,000
55,000
50,169.43
36,000
37,500
55,400
75,000
46,000
12,000
9,000

12%
10o00
10.75%
13%
11%
12%
11%
14%
13%
12%
11.5%
10.5%
11%
7%
7.5%

52,100
58,500
7,000
10,000
33,000
38,500
11,500
29,500.58
58,000
5,000
50,000
13,213.72

10%
1000
12076
12.5%
12%
6%
8.5%
11%
15%
10%
10.5%

December
1049
1057
1066
1075
1080
1085
1090
1101
1109
1115
1121
1128

C08
A06
E06
E07
D09
A01
D07
A05
E03
E05
B09
EIO

2
3
5
2
5
5
0
0
10
0
3
0

52,550
76,000
12,000
15,000
43,000
43,500
11,500
34,524.07
65,000
5,000
70,000
34,500
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